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Comparative Limits on Police Searches of
Smartphones Upon Arrest
BRYCE CLAYTON NEWELL† AND BERT-JAAP KOOPS†
The search of a smartphone by the police in connection with an arrest carries the potential to
intrude into the very core of an arrestee’s private life. Indeed, such a search has been compared
to providing a “window[] to our inner private lives,” including aspects of our lives completely
disconnected from the reasons for the arrest. In recent years, the supreme courts of the United
States, Canada, and the Netherlands (as well as Dutch legislators) have handed down rules about
how, and whether, police may search an arrestee’s smartphone upon arrest without first
obtaining a warrant or other court order. These responses can be categorized as either containerbased or content-based approaches, depending on whether the court (or legislature) focuses on
protecting the privacy-sensitive content (for example, personal information) as such or, rather,
the container (for example, the smartphone) as a proxy for protecting privacy-sensitive content
contained within the device. After analyzing and comparing the approaches adopted in each of
these three countries, we argue that both approaches have advantages and disadvantages, and
we suggest a combination of the two as a fruitful path forward, balancing the important privacy
and law enforcement interests at stake.
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University of Oregon.
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The [government] asserts that a search of all data stored on a cell phone is
“materially indistinguishable” from searches of these sorts of physical items
[such as cigarette packs, wallets, or address books]. That is like saying a ride
on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon. Both
are ways of getting from point A to point B, but little else justifies lumping
them together.
— Chief Justice John Roberts, United States Supreme Court1

INTRODUCTION
If a traditional police search of an arrestee’s pockets, purse, or wallet for
investigatory purposes can be characterized as a simple “ride on horseback,”
then, comparatively, a similar search of an arrestee’s smartphone is “a flight to
the moon.”2 The two searches, although both relevant to law enforcement
investigations, are fundamentally distinguishable from each other in character—
as noted by Chief Justice John Roberts of the Supreme Court of the United
States, “[b]oth are ways of getting from point A to point B, but little else justifies
lumping them together.”3 The distinction, according to the Court in its
unanimous 2014 decision in Riley v. California,4 is compelled by the underlying
interest in personal privacy that limits unreasonable police searches of private
persons and their property. While “inspecting the contents of an arrestee’s
pockets works no substantial additional intrusion on privacy beyond the arrest
itself,” the search of the person’s cellphone constitutes a qualitatively and
quantitatively different (and much greater) intrusion into personal privacy.5 And,
the Supreme Court’s holding is not limited to the most modern smartphones.
Indeed, the ruling extends to both smartphones and not-so-smart phones, as the
Court found that even a “flip phone” exhibiting “a smaller range of features than
a smart phone . . . [is] based on technology nearly inconceivable just a few
decades ago.”6 As put by one Canadian court, “[s]earches of these devices
engender privacy concerns that have no analogue.”7 Additionally, questions
about the proper scope of searches conducted incident to arrest are important, in
part, because, “[t]he power to search incident to arrest not only permits searches

1. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393 (2014) (citation omitted).
2. Id. In Riley, the search of two different types of cellphones were at issue: a “smart phone”—defined by
the court as “a cell phone with a broad range of other functions based on advanced computing capability, large
storage capacity, and Internet connectivity”—and a “flip phone” exhibiting “a smaller range of features than a
smart phone.” Id. at 379–80. Although the Court focused much of its reasoning on the advanced capabilities of
modern smartphones, the holding covered both. In the Court’s words, “[b]oth phones are based on technology
nearly inconceivable just a few decades ago.” Id. at 385. As such, although we focus in this Article on modern
smartphones, we also discuss where doctrine might make distinctions between different mobile phones based on
their (broad or limited) capabilities.
3. Id. at 393.
4. Id. at 373.
5. Id. at 375.
6. Id. at 379–80, 385.
7. R. v. Nero (2016), 345 O.A.C. 282, para. 157 (Can. Ont. C.A.).

232

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:229

without a warrant, but does so in circumstances in which the grounds to obtain
a warrant do not exist.”8
Only a few months after the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS)
decided Riley, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) was confronted with a
similar question: whether “the general common law framework for searches
incident to arrest needs to be modified in the case of cell phone searches incident
to arrest.”9 Additionally, in the Netherlands, courts have also grappled with this
question in recent years—and while lower courts had been split on the issue, the
Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) finally addressed the issue in 2017.10
In each of these lines of cases, courts have had to weigh law enforcement
interests against suspects’ interests in privacy and to determine whether existing
legal frameworks for regulating searches incident to arrest should be modified
to account for the fact that these searches can constitute a “much more
significant invasion of privacy”11 than the sorts of searches envisioned by those
who promulgated these frameworks. Similar challenges apply to the ability of
law enforcement to search other types of computing devices, including, for
example, digital cameras,12 laptop computers, or computers embedded in
automobiles.13
Indeed, the power to search the vast amount of information that modern
smartphones might contain would allow the police to overcome prior limitations
(or “physical realities”) that existed in the pre-smartphone environment.14 In
effect, this is a situation where
[c]ourts and legislators have had to deal with questions about how the law
relating to atoms applies to cases involving bits (in the absence of bits-specific
law), facing the fact that bits and atoms have different properties and finding
that the law is not adequately suited to cope with relevant differences.15

And, as demonstrated by the fact that courts and legislators in multiple
countries have been grappling with this issue for years, these cases pose
8. R. v. Fearon, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 621, para. 16 (Can.).
9. Id. at para. 58.
10. HR 4 april 2017, ECLI:NR:HR:2017:584 (Neth.).
11. Fearon, 3 S.C.R. at para. 58.
12. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mauricio, 80 N.E.3d 318, 324 (Mass. 2017) (holding, on state
constitutional grounds, that “the search of data contained in digital cameras falls outside the scope of the search
incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement”).
13. See, e.g., Mobley v. State, 816 S.E.2d 769, 770–71 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018) (holding that the defendant did
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in data collected from the “airbag control module” in his car after
a high-speed crash).
14. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393 (2014) (“One of the most notable distinguishing features of
modern cell phones is their immense storage capacity. Before cell phones, a search of a person was limited by
physical realities and tended as a general matter to constitute only a narrow intrusion on privacy.”).
15. Ronald Leenes, Of Horses and Other Animals of Cyberspace, 1 TECH. & REGUL. 1, 1 (2019),
https://techreg.org/index.php/techreg/article/view/3/techreg.2019.001. A stark example of a court simply
denying that, in the context of arrest-related searches, digital realities differ from physical realities is a South
African case, State v. Miller. 2015 (4) All SA (WCC) at 27 para. 51 (S. Afr.) (“In any event, given the importance
of speedy investigatory steps in the fight against crime it seems counter-productive to require the police to follow
a bureaucratic procedure to access digital information, a procedure which would not be required in respect of
non-digital evidential material.”).
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important questions for continuing or extending our historical approach to
criminal procedure—questions that extend beyond the law and experience of
any single nation.
This is particularly true since the law has often protected underlying
privacy interests by protecting concrete proxies (for example, objects or
containers, such as houses, bags, or digital devices that enclose or surround
aspects of a person’s private life)16 rather than the underlying (and sometimes
abstract) privacy interests themselves. This is largely a pragmatic solution, as it
provides police officers (and other government agents) with relatively concrete
and identifiable rules to work with, rather than forcing them to make complex,
ex ante determinations about when a search is allowed based on abstract notions
of privacy. However, protecting privacy by proxy can also limit flexibility down
the line as new technologies or investigatory measures develop that bypass
historically identified proxies, and that facilitate the privacy intrusions the earlier
proxies were designed to prohibit.
In this Article, our first aim is to analyze how legislators and judges in three
countries (the United States, Canada, and the Netherlands) are responding to the
increasingly common scenario where police seek to obtain information from
people’s smartphones incident to an arrest—an investigatory method that
challenges traditional legal frameworks within procedural criminal law,
especially since the privacy-intrusiveness of smartphone searches extends well
beyond what lawmakers anticipated when drafting existing criminal procedure
law (including various search-incident-to-arrest exceptions across jurisdictions).
Importantly, we exclude consent-based searches from our analysis, examining
only those cases where searches are conducted without the consent of the
suspect.17
Our second aim is to outline various conceptual and normative anchor
points that may help legislators and others deal with this issue. In earlier
research, we identified new boundary-marking concepts arising in various
jurisdictions to protect privacy in the context of criminal procedure.18 This paper
allows us to analyze whether and to what extent these new concepts may help in
regulating police smartphone searches. Specifically, we examine whether and
how a combination of emerging and pre-existing container-based and contentbased approaches to regulating police searches might be used to solve the
challenge of finding a framework that is both sufficiently concrete (to be
manageable for police officers) and sufficiently technology-neutral (to be
sustainable in light of significant and ongoing socio-technical change). This
16. See Bert-Jaap Koops, Bryce Clayton Newell, Tjerk Timan, Ivan Škorvánek, Tomislav Chokrevski &
Maša Galič, A Typology of Privacy, 38 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 483, 540–44 (2017) (exemplifying objects used as
proxies in privacy law).
17. Consent provides a basic exception to limits on investigatory police searches in all three jurisdictions
examined in this study.
18. Bert-Jaap Koops, Bryce Clayton Newell & Ivan Škorvánek, Location Tracking By Police: The
Regulation of ‘Tireless and Absolute Surveillance’, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 635, 685 (2019); Ivan Škorvánek,
Bert-Jaap Koops, Bryce Clayton Newell & Andrew Roberts, “My Computer Is My Castle”: New Privacy
Frameworks to Regulate Police Hacking, 2019 BYU L. REV. 997, 1078 (2019).
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analysis can help practitioners and courts further develop rules on smartphone
searches, especially since the rules stipulated by the supreme courts we reference
here remain rather general and raise questions in post-judgment practice.
In this research, we engage in comparative, doctrinal legal analysis. We
conducted doctrinal legal analysis research for three jurisdictions (United States,
Canada, and the Netherlands) and compared our findings across jurisdictions.
We chose these three jurisdictions based on their relevance to a larger
comparative study of privacy and criminal law and procedure and the fact that,
of the countries in that larger study, these three have each had a recent supreme
court ruling addressing the question of when police may search a suspect’s
smartphone during or shortly after an arrest.19
Some limitations apply. Our analysis only covers searches conducted by
the police following and connected (incidental) to a lawful arrest. We do not
examine legal rules that govern police searches of smartphones (or cellphones)
outside the search-incident-to-arrest context. We also do not examine the
regulation of device searches at international borders or points of entry, where
different legal rules often apply. Additionally, we assume for the purposes of
our analysis that police are technically capable of looking inside a seized
smartphone, for instance, because it is not password-protected, or it is seized
when unlocked. Questions of compelled disclosure of passwords or biometric
disclosure raise different types of questions and fall outside the scope of our
analysis.20
In Part I, we outline the basic contours of the law regarding police searches
incident to arrest in the three chosen countries and then examine how the
respective supreme courts have ruled in cases involving searches of cellphones
incident to arrest. In Part II, we examine these developments from a more
conceptual and theoretical perspective, analyzing how the reasoning in these
recent court rulings fits into broader debates about protecting privacy in an era
when the “privacies of life”21 are often held in (or are accessible through) a small
device that fits inside a person’s pocket. We highlight how the U.S. approach to
protecting privacy and limiting law enforcement investigations focuses on
protecting proxies, like smartphones themselves, while Canadian and Dutch
approaches focus more on the content to be searched or examined. The
regulatory choice to either institute a blanket ban on investigatory conduct (like
that imposed by Riley) or a more nuanced, case-by-case, and context-dependent
inquiry (like those promulgated in Canada and the Netherlands) has a significant
19. See Koops et al., supra note 16, at 504–10 (noting information about the methodology we employed in
the broader study); Koops et al., supra note 18, at 639–40; Bert-Jaap Koops, Bryce Clayton Newell, Andrew
Roberts, Ivan Škorvánek & Maša Galič, The Reasonableness of Remaining Unobserved: A Comparative
Analysis of Visual Surveillance and Voyeurism in Criminal Law, 43 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1210, 1212–13 (2018).
20. For recent discussions of compelled decryption, see, for example, Orin S. Kerr, Compelled Decryption
and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 97 TEX. L. REV. 767, 799 (2019); Laurent Sacharoff, Response,
What Am I Really Saying When I Open My Smartphone? A Response to Orin S. Kerr, 97 TEX. L. REV. ONLINE
63, 72 (2019).
21. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217–18 (2018) (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S.
373, 403 (2014)).
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impact on how privacy is protected. In conclusion, we argue that a balance
between these container- and content-based approaches to regulating police
searches of smartphones (and similar devices) might provide a better way
forward, providing practical, usable guidance for police officers on the ground
but not ignoring the fact that not all searches of digital devices are, or need to
be, flights to the moon.

I. THE POWER TO SEARCH CELLPHONES INCIDENT TO ARREST
In this Part, we outline the basic contours of the law regarding police
searches incident to arrest in our three chosen countries, analyze recent high
court decisions that examine how their respective search-incident-to-arrest
doctrines apply in the context of cellphone searches, and finally examine how
these decisions have been interpreted in subsequent case law. We focus in
particular on how the privacy interest in these cases has been conceptualized and
translated into legal limits on law enforcement searches of cellphones.
A. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
1. Overview of the Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine
In the United States, police searches (generally, investigatory measures
carried out to collect evidence) are regulated by the Fourth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution.22 The Fourth Amendment prohibits state agents from
conducting “unreasonable searches”—those that would intrude on a person’s
interests in their property or their reasonable expectations of privacy—without
first obtaining a judicial warrant.23 The Amendment explicitly covers “persons,
houses, papers [including correspondence], and effects [property].”24 Over the
years, SCOTUS has crafted a variety of exceptions to this general rule. Although
it existed in practice prior to its formal recognition by the courts, SCOTUS first
acknowledged the search-incident-to-arrest exception in 1914, in Weeks v.
United States,25 even though it was not directly relevant in that case. In Weeks,
the Court acknowledged, in dicta, “the right on the part of the Government,
always recognized under English and American law, to search the person of the
accused when legally arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of
crime.”26 According to the Court in Riley v. California, one hundred years later,
Since that time, it has been well accepted that such a search constitutes an
exception to the warrant requirement. Indeed, the label “exception” is
something of a misnomer in this context, as warrantless searches incident to
arrest occur with far greater frequency than searches conducted pursuant to a
warrant.27
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Id.
Id.
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
Id.
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382 (2014).
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In the one hundred years between Weeks and Riley, the scope of the
search-incident-to-arrest exception garnered a “checkered history.”28 When the
Court was confronted with questions about the applicability of the exception to
smartphone searches in Riley, there were three primary cases that governed
searches incident to arrest: Chimel v. California,29 United States v. Robinson,30
and Arizona v. Gant.31 In Chimel (from 1969), the Court invalidated an
exhaustive search of an arrestee’s entire house and noted that the purposes
served by the exception were to protect officer safety and to preserve
evidence.32 According to the Court,
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the
person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to
use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety
might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is
entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any
evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or
destruction. . . . There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the
arrestee’s person and the area “within his immediate control”—construing that
phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence.33

However, four years later in Robinson, the Court interpreted this test rather
broadly, holding that an arresting officer may conduct a pat-down of the
arrestee’s body and clothing and even go so far as to open containers found on
the suspect’s person, even when the search moves beyond being a search for
weapons or evidence related to the crime at hand.34 Ultimately, the Court held
that searches incident to arrest are a legitimate response to “the need to disarm
and to discover evidence”35 (to ensure officer safety, to preserve evidence, and
to secure evidence related to the crime for which the suspect had been arrested).
As long as the arrest itself was lawful, the Court held,
a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification. It is the fact
of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, and we hold that
in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only
an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also
a “reasonable” search under that Amendment.36

Finally, in Gant, the Court applied the language of Chimel to limit the
ability of police officers to search the passenger compartment of an automobile
incident to an arrest, except in circumstances “when the arrestee is unsecured

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 350 (2009)).
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969).
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973).
Gant, 556 U.S. at 351.
Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762–63.
Id.
Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236. In this case, a “crumpled package of cigarettes” containing illicit drugs. Id.
Id. at 235.
Id.
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and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the
search.”37
2. Searching Cellphones Incident to Arrest Prior to Riley
In Riley, SCOTUS consolidated two separate underlying cases: United
States v. Wurie38 (a federal First Circuit case from Massachusetts) and People v.
Riley39 (a California state case). In Wurie, a Boston Police Department detective
observed Brima Wurie engage in what looked like a drug transaction.40 After
arresting the buyer and confirming that Wurie had sold him crack cocaine, the
police followed Wurie and arrested him near his home as he exited his vehicle.41
The police seized two phones, but did not immediately search them incident to
Wurie’s arrest.42 Rather, their limited search of one of the phones came later,
while Wurie was waiting to be booked into jail.43 After noticing that one of the
phones was receiving calls from a number marked as “my house,” the police
accessed the phone, viewed the wallpaper on the screen, accessed the call log,
and acquired the number that had been making the incoming calls.44 The trial
court judge noted that although “[i]t seems indisputable that a person has a
subjective expectation of privacy in the contents of his or her cell phone . . . the
search of Wurie’s cell phone incident to his arrest was limited and reasonable.”45
In so holding, the judge cited numerous district court decisions from around the
country that had come to similar conclusions.46
37. Gant, 556 U.S. at 343. In Gant, the Court also announced a new, automobile-specific exception,
allowing officers to search a passenger compartment “when it is ‘reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the
crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.’” Id. (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004)
(Scalia, J., concurring)).
38. United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373
(2014).
39. People v. Riley, No. D059840, 2013 WL 475242, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2013), rev’d and
remanded sub nom. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
40. Wurie, 728 F.3d at 1.
41. Id. at 2.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. United States v. Wurie, 612 F. Supp. 2d 104, 109–10 (D. Mass. 2009).
46. For example, in United States v. Finley, the Fifth Circuit held that a cellphone was analogous to other
types of closed containers that might be found on a person, such as a package of cigarettes or a footlocker. 477
F.3d 250, 260 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that the exception applied to the search of “call records and text messages”
on the arrestee’s phone); see also United States v. Mercado-Nava, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1277 (D. Kan. 2007)
(“Traditional search warrant exceptions apply to the search of cell phones.”); United States v. Deans, 549 F.
Supp. 2d 1085, 1094 (D. Minn. 2008) (“[I]f a cell phone is lawfully seized, officers may also search any data
electronically stored in the device.”); United States v. Valdez, No. 06-CCR-336, 2008 WL 360548, at *3–4 (E.D.
Wis. Feb. 8, 2008) (searching the defendant’s phone contemporaneously with his arrest was reasonable); United
States v. Dennis, No. 07-008, 2007 WL 3400500, at *7 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 13, 2007) (finding that the search of a
cell phone incident to valid arrest was no different from the search of any other type of evidence seized incident
to arrest). In other cases, judges analogized cellphones to pagers, an earlier technology that courts had already
decided fit into the container analogy. See, e.g., Wurie, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 109; United States v. Reyes, 922 F.
Supp. 818, 834 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that a warrantless search of the stored memory of two pagers was
justified by the search-incident-to-arrest exception); United States v. Chan, 830 F. Supp. 531, 535 (N.D. Cal.
1993) (finding that the warrantless search of pager memory was comparable to searching through the contents
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However, not all lower courts were convinced that cellphones should be
treated as ordinary containers. In United States v. Wall,47 for example, a judge
in the Southern District of Florida rejected the cellphone-as-container analogy,
stating that “searching through information stored on a cell phone [in the context
of an inventory search] is analogous to a search of a sealed letter, which requires
a warrant.”48 And in United States v. Park,49 a California court likewise
distinguished cellphones from pagers (and other, more traditional, containers).
“Any contrary holding,” the court stated, “could have far-ranging
consequences,” because
modern cellular phones have the capacity for storing immense amounts of
private information. Unlike pagers or address books, modern cell phones
record incoming and outgoing calls, and can also contain address books,
calendars, voice and text messages, email, video and pictures. Individuals can
store highly personal information on their cell phones, and can record their
most private thoughts and conversations on their cell phones through email
and text, voice and instant messages.50

In Wurie, on appeal, the First Circuit reversed the trial judge’s holding that
the search of Wurie’s phone was reasonable, finding that the search-incident-toarrest exception, as a general rule, does not authorize the warrantless search of
data on a cellphone seized from an arrestee’s person during an arrest.51 The First
Circuit noted that courts around the country
have struggled to apply the Supreme Court’s search-incident-to-arrest
jurisprudence to the search of data on a cell phone seized from the person. The
searches at issue in the cases that have arisen thus far have involved everything
from simply obtaining a cell phone’s number to looking through an arrestee’s
call records, text messages, or photographs.52

Although most courts to address the issue had upheld warrantless searches
of cellphones incident to arrest, the First Circuit rejected this line of
argumentation, noting that it “fails to account for the fact that the Supreme Court
has determined that there are categories of searches undertaken following an
arrest that are inherently unreasonable because they are never justified by one of

of a container); United States v. Diaz-Lizaraza, 981 F.2d 1216, 1223 (11th Cir. 1993) (finding that it was
reasonable for law enforcement agents to activate the defendant’s pager to confirm its number). As other
evidence that courts had latched onto the cellphone-as-container idea, some judges also authorized warrantless
searches of cellphones pursuant to the automobile exception. In United States v. James, one district court judge
held that “the automobile exception allows the search of the cell phone just as it allows a search of other closed
containers found in vehicles.” No. 1:06CR134 CDP, 2008 WL 1925032, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 29, 2008).
47. United States v. Wall, No. 08-60016-CR, 2008 WL 5381412, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 2008).
48. Id.
49. United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007).
50. Id. (footnote omitted).
51. United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 11–12 (1st Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Riley v. California, 573 U.S.
373 (2014).
52. Id. at 5 (citations omitted).
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the Chimel rationales: protecting arresting officers or preserving destructible
evidence.”53
Thus, the First Circuit held that, to be lawful, a search of a cellphone
incident to arrest must fall within one of these limits imposed by Chimel (for
example, protecting officers or preserving evidence).54 The court emphasized
their finding that cellphones (as well as tablet or laptop computers) have the
capacity to store much more information than something like a pager, purse, or
cigarette package (more traditional “containers”), and that this
information is, by and large, of a highly personal nature: photographs, videos,
written and audio messages (text, email, and voicemail), contacts, calendar
appointments, web search and browsing history, purchases, and financial and
medical records. It is the kind of information one would previously have stored
in one’s home and that would have been off-limits to officers performing a
search incident to arrest.55

This difference, the court noted, expanded the “nature and scope of the
search itself,” and was not only limited to a distinction based on the nature of
the object seized.56 Thus, at issue is the fact that, “[a]t the touch of a button a
cell phone search becomes a house search, and that is not a search of a
‘container’ in any normal sense of that word, though a house contains data.”57
Although other courts had decided these questions on a case-by-case basis, the
First Circuit went so far as to proclaim a general rule that cellphones could never
be authorized by the search-incident-to-arrest exception; the court stated, “[w]e
therefore hold that the search-incident-to-arrest exception does not authorize the
warrantless search of data on a cell phone seized from an arrestee’s person,
because the government has not convinced us that such a search is ever
necessary to protect arresting officers or preserve destructible evidence.”58
In the second case consolidated into Riley v. California at the Court, People
v. Riley, the California Court of Appeals upheld a search of David Riley’s
cellphone.59 In that case, Riley was arrested after he had become a suspect in a
gang-related shooting of a passing vehicle.60 His phone was seized (along with
two firearms), and an officer searched and noticed gang-related content on the
phone.61 Later, another officer searched Riley’s phone at the police station,
accessing videos, photographs, and other files during his search.62 In holding
53. Id. at 7.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 8 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
56. Id. at 9.
57. Id. at 8–9 (quoting United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 806 (7th Cir. 2012)). The FloresLopez court found that evidence preservation concerns in that case outweighed any invasion of privacy,
upholding the warrantless search of the cell phone, because the search at issue was minimally invasive—only
directed at discovering the phone’s number. 670 F.3d at 809–10.
58. Wurie, 728 F.3d at 13.
59. People v. Riley, No. D059840, 2013 WL 475242, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2013), rev’d and
remanded sub nom. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
60. Id. at *1.
61. Id. at *3.
62. Id.
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that the warrantless search of Riley’s phone was justified, the California Court
of Appeals relied on a prior California Supreme Court decision holding that even
“a delayed search of an item immediately associated with the arrestee’s person
may be justified as incident to a lawful custodial arrest without consideration as
to whether an exigency for the search exists.”63 The People v. Riley court did not
offer any substantive discussion related to privacy, nor about equating
cellphones with ordinary containers. Indeed, in People v. Diaz, the California
Supreme Court had expressly disclaimed any ability to restrict searches of
cellphones based on their information-rich nature under existing SCOTUS
precedent.64 According to the court, “[t]he relevant high court decisions do not
support the view that whether police must get a warrant before searching an item
they have properly seized from an arrestee’s person incident to a lawful custodial
arrest depends on the item’s character, including its capacity for storing personal
information.”65
In contrast to Wurie (and, eventually, the subsequent decision by
SCOTUS), the California Supreme Court was not persuaded that the storage
capacity of a cellphone should be determinative of the issue of whether a search
was reasonable.66 According to the court, “[e]ven ‘small spatial container[s]’
that hold less information than cell phones may contain highly personal, intimate
and private information, such as photographs, letters, or diaries.”67
3. Riley at the Supreme Court
In January 2017, SCOTUS granted certiorari to both underlying cases,
consolidating them into a single case for the purpose of determining whether the
search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement should extend to searches of cellphones.68 A unanimous Court ruled
that they should not—and that searches of cellphones, even incident to arrest,
should generally require a judicial warrant.69
In his primary opinion, Chief Justice Roberts focused attention on the longstanding principle that “the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
‘reasonableness’” and that, in the law enforcement investigative context,
“reasonableness generally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant.”70 Then,
after outlining general search-incident-to-arrest doctrine (including Chimel and
63. Id. at *4 (citing People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 506 (Cal. 2011)).
64. Diaz, 244 P.3d at 506.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 507.
67. Id. at 508 (second alteration in original) (citation omitted). But see United States v. Bah, 794 F.3d 617,
632–34 (6th Cir. 2015) (holding that Riley was distinguishable because “[t]he storage capacity of the magnetic
strip of a credit, debit or gift card pales in comparison to that of a computer hard drive, cell phone, or even
audiocassette”).
68. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 378 (2014). The Court framed the question as: “whether the police
may, without a warrant, search digital information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been
arrested.” Id.
69. Id. at 403.
70. Id. at 381–82 (emphasis added) (first quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006); and
then quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995)).
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Robinson, discussed above), Justice Roberts moved directly to addressing the
intrusive nature of cellphone searches. In his words, modern “phones are based
on technology nearly inconceivable just a few decades ago, when Chimel and
Robinson were decided.”71 Thus, the “categorical rule” set out in Robinson (that
searches incident to arrest were reasonable as a consequence of the arrest
itself)—while striking “the appropriate balance in the context of physical
objects”—should not carry “much force with respect to digital content on cell
phones.”72 Indeed, while “the two risks identified in Chimel—harm to officers
and destruction of evidence—are present in all custodial arrests,” the Court
found that, “[t]here are no comparable risks when the search is of digital data.”73
According to the Court, exemptions to the warrant requirement must be
assessed by balancing “the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an
individual’s privacy [with] the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of
legitimate governmental interests.”74 In the case of cellphone searches, the Court
opined,
The United States asserts that a search of all data stored on a cell phone is
“materially indistinguishable” from searches of these sorts of physical items.
That is like saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a
flight to the moon. Both are ways of getting from point A to point B, but little
else justifies lumping them together. Modern cell phones, as a category,
implicate privacy concerns far beyond those implicated by the search of a
cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse.75

The Court subsequently elaborated the many traditional devices a
cellphone might incorporate (“[t]hey could just as easily be called cameras,
video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums,
televisions, maps, or newspapers”) and focused, at length, on the storage
capacity of the devices.76 Storage capacity was important to the Court, because
it related directly to questions of privacy and the intrusiveness of an
investigatory search.77 In sum, the Court’s concerns can be summarized as a
direct reaction to “the likelihood that an electronic device will contain 1) many
kinds of data, 2) in vast amounts, and 3) corresponding to a long swath of
time.”78
First, the Court drew on concerns related to the mosaic theory,79 finding
that, “a cell phone collects in one place many distinct types of information—an

71. Id. at 385.
72. Id. at 386.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 385.
75. Id. at 393.
76. See id. at 393–97.
77. Id.
78. United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2015) (discussing the considerations the
Court in Riley relied on in determining the need for a warrant to search a cellphone).
79. For more on the mosaic theory, see, for example, Koops et al., supra note 18, at 693–95; Bryce Clayton
Newell, Privacy and Surveillance in the Streets: An Introduction, in SURVEILLANCE, PRIVACY AND PUBLIC
SPACE 1, 4–6 (Bryce Clayton Newell, Tjerk Timan & Bert-Jaap Koops eds. 2019); Christopher Slobogin, Making
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address, a note, a prescription, a bank statement, a video—that reveal much more
in combination than any isolated record.”80 Relatedly, the Court noted that a
cell phone’s capacity allows even just one type of information to convey far
more than previously possible. The sum of an individual’s private life can be
reconstructed through a thousand photographs labeled with dates, locations,
and descriptions; the same cannot be said of a photograph or two of loved ones
tucked into a wallet.81

Second, the Court found it persuasive that cellphones documented a
person’s personal life and communication much more pervasively than older
technologies, such as a diary, and that this meant it is more likely that law
enforcement would be able to find evidence in any given investigation.82 As
noted by the Court, “[a]llowing the police to scrutinize such records on a routine
basis is quite different from allowing them to search a personal item or two in
the occasional case.”83
Additionally, the Court noted that, since cellphones often contained
information that was stored elsewhere (for example, in the cloud), allowing
police to search these records incident to arrest might allow the search to “extend
well beyond papers and effects in the physical proximity of an arrestee,”84 an
important limitation on the exception. And, in response to concerns raised in the
underlying cases about cellphone searches essentially amounting to searches of
an arrestee’s house, the Court stated,
In 1926, Learned Hand observed . . . that it is “a totally different thing to
search a man’s pockets and use against him what they contain, from
ransacking his house for everything which may incriminate him.” If his
pockets contain a cell phone, however, that is no longer true. Indeed, a cell
phone search would typically expose to the government far more than the most
exhaustive search of a house: A phone not only contains in digital form many
sensitive records previously found in the home; it also contains a broad array
of private information never found in a home in any form—unless the phone
is.85

In dicta, the Court also rejected prosecutors’ proposals that police ought to
be able to search cellphones incident to arrest solely for evidence related to the
the Most of United States v. Jones in a Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 12–13 (2012); David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, A Shattered Looking
Glass: The Pitfalls and Potential of the Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH.
381, 402–11 (2013) (raising a number of criticisms of the impact of the mosaic theory on Fourth Amendment
law); Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 315 (2012) (asserting
“as a normative matter, courts should reject the mosaic theory.”). The Court has also raised similar concerns in
other recent Fourth Amendment cases. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417–18 (2012)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 428–31 (Alito, J., concurring); Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206,
2216 (2018) (referring to information that was “detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled”).
80. Riley, 573 U.S. at 394.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 394–95.
83. Id. at 395.
84. Id. at 398.
85. Id. at 396–97 (citation omitted).
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crime leading to the arrest or “where an officer reasonably believes that
information relevant to the crime, the arrestee’s identity, or officer safety will be
discovered.”86 These proposed limitations, in the Court’s view, “would prove no
practical limit at all” or, at least, “impose few meaningful constraints on
officers.”87 The Court also rejected the proposal that officers should be able to
“search cell phone data if they could have obtained the same information from
a pre-digital counterpart,” refusing to force courts and officers from engaging
on “a difficult line-drawing expedition to determine which digital files are
comparable to physical records” on a case-by-case basis.88 According to the
Court,
Modern cell phones are not just another technological convenience. With
all they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for many Americans “the
privacies of life.” The fact that technology now allows an individual to carry
such information in his hand does not make the information any less worthy
of the protection for which the Founders fought. Our answer to the question
of what police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an
arrest is accordingly simple—get a warrant.89

4. Post-Riley Case Law
In the years since Riley was decided, hundreds of state and federal cases
have cited the decision, many also involving cellphone searches. These cases
have ranged from high school principals searching students’ phones for text
messages,90 to searches of government employees’ cellphones by their
supervisors,91 to officers viewing call logs or text messages or verifying a
phone’s number,92 and officers searching parolees’ phones during an
investigatory detention.93 Courts have held that certain populations have
86. Id. at 399.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 400–01.
89. Id. at 403 (citation omitted).
90. Jackson v. McCurry, 762 F. App’x 919, 927 (11th Cir. 2019) (distinguishing this case, because Riley
“did not attempt to spell out how its holding could be transposed to the setting of a public school”).
91. United States v. Cochran, 682 F. App’x 828, 839 (11th Cir. 2017) (finding that existing precedent did
not give supervisor “fair warning” that search was unlawful).
92. See, e.g., United States v. Gary, 790 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 2015); United States v. Jenkins, 850 F.3d
912, 916 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Lustig, 830 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 2016); United States v. Lewis,
615 F. App’x 332, 337–38 (6th Cir. 2015) (finding that Riley applied to officer’s accessing text messages on an
arrestee’s cell phone incident to arrest, but that the violation constituted “harmless error” due to the amount of
additional evidence the police had acquired from other means); United States v. Govan, 641 F. App’x 434, 435
(5th Cir. 2016); United States v. Blackman, 625 F. App’x 231, 234 (6th Cir. 2015); United States v. Monestime,
677 F. App’x 76, 79 (3d Cir. 2017) (admission of evidence obtained pursuant to officer’s search “for recent calls
and contacts,” conducted pre-Riley, was justified by the good faith and independent source exceptions to the
exclusionary rule).
93. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 875 F.3d 1265, 1275 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that that a warrantless
search of the defendant’s phone was not unconstitutional because parolees have a diminished expectation of
privacy); United States v. Collier, 932 F.3d 1067, 1073–74 (8th Cir. 2019) (holding that an offender under
supervised release has a diminished expectation of privacy, even after Riley); United States v. Hathorn, 920 F.3d
982, 975 (5th Cir. 2019) (finding that a special condition allowing probation officer to access probationer’s cell
phone did not violate the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Jackson, 866 F.3d 982, 983 (8th Cir. 2017)
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diminished privacy interests in their phones—for example, a parolee might lose
the ability to contest a warrantless search on this basis,94 but probationers may
not, as their interests are not as significantly reduced.95 Even in the border search
context, where law enforcement usually has greater ability to search devices at
international entry points, courts, like the Ninth Circuit, have used the reasoning
in Riley to limit investigatory powers.96 The Ninth Circuit has also extended
Riley’s holding that cellphones should not be analogized to traditional
“containers” in the contexts of automobile or probation searches.97
Additionally, courts have extended Riley’s reasoning to searches of other
electronic devices, including laptop computers98 and digital cameras.99 For
example, in Schlossberg v. Solesbee (decided pre-Riley, but relying on similar
reasoning), one district court judge stated,
it is impractical to distinguish between electronic devices—between a laptop
and a traditional cell phone or a smart phone and a camera, before an officer
decides whether to proceed with a search of the electronic device incident to
arrest. A rule requiring officers to distinguish between electronic devices is
impractical. It would require officers to learn and memorize the capabilities of
constantly changing electronic devices. A primary goal in search and seizure
law has been to provide law enforcement with clear standards to follow. In
sum because an electronic device like a camera has a high expectation of
privacy in its contents, an officer may not review the contents as a search
incident to arrest.100

Citing both Riley and Schlossberg, a federal judge in New York similarly
held that searches of digital cameras were comparable to searches of
smartphones, due to their “capacity to store a vast number[] of images.”101
However, other courts have come to (arguably) alternate conclusions, for

(holding that warrantless search of Jackson’s cell phone did not violate the Fourth Amendment because Jackson
was serving a term of supervised release and living in a community correctional facility, and that, in these
circumstances, Jackson had “no legitimate expectation of privacy in the cell phone”).
94. See, e.g., Johnson, 875 F.3d at 1275; Collier, 932 F.3d at 1073–74; Hathorn, 920 F.3d at 975; Jackson,
866 F.3d at 983.
95. United States v. Lara, 815 F.3d 605, 610–12 (9th Cir. 2016). The Ninth Circuit held that “while the
privacy interest of a probationer has been ‘significantly diminished,’” the defendant still “had a privacy interest
in his cell phone and the data it contained. That privacy interest was substantial in light of the broad amount of
data contained in, or accessible through, his cell phone.” Id.
96. United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002, 1019–20 (9th Cir. 2019).
97. Lara, 815 F.3d at 610–11 (first citing Riley, 573 U.S. at 397; and then citing United States v. Camou,
773 F.3d 932, 942–43 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding that a cellphone should not be considered a “container” as part of
a reasonable “search of an automobile” or “for purposes of a probation search”)).
98. United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 487–91 (6th Cir. 2015).
99. See Schlossberg v. Solesbee, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170 (D. Or. 2012). Cf. Am. News & Info. Servs.,
Inc. v. Gore, No. 12-CV-2186 BEN KSC, 2014 WL 4681936, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2014) (“The Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Riley v. California provides some guidance, but leaves the law with regard to cameras
unsettled.”).
100. Schlossberg, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1170.
101. United States v. Whiteside, No. 13 CR 576 PAC, 2015 WL 3953477, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2015)
(“Here, the digital camera provided officers with much of the same information about Whiteside as that obtained
by the officers, and used against the defendant, in Riley.”).
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example, in a case involving the search of an arrestee’s video cameras on
multiple occasions, in which the judge concluded that the “cameras at issue here
appear to fall somewhere between the physical search of a cigarette package
found in a pocket during a search incident to arrest allowed under United States
v. Robinson, and the data search of a cell phone under Riley that generally
requires a warrant.”102
Decisions such as this, which are in conflict with the reasoning in
Schlossberg, demonstrate the existing ambiguity in how, or whether, lower
courts will seek to differentiate between types of digital devices (for example,
based on the specific storage capacity or technical capabilities of different
devices).
Several cases (both pre- and post-Riley) have held that the police calling a
suspect’s phone (to verify the number associated with the seized phone and its
connection to the suspect) or simply viewing information available on a phone’s
lock screen did not constitute searches under the Fourth Amendment.103 These
decisions have rested on a distinction between police officers: (1) interacting
with the phone at an external level (for example, merely viewing a message on
the lock screen or calling the phone’s number); and (2) affirmatively opening,
manipulating, accessing, or retrieving “any information from within the
phone.”104
For example, in United States v. Brixen, an undercover detective posing as
a fourteen-year-old girl in online conversations with the defendant sent the
defendant a Snapchat message just after his arrest to “illustrate that the officers
knew why he was there and that he had been interacting with an undercover
detective.”105 The Seventh Circuit found that, once a suspect had been arrested,
he lost his right to keep his phone in his pocket (out of sight of the officers), and
that “just as an individual who fails to conceal a phone’s ring from those in
earshot does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, an individual who
allows notifications to appear to those in plain sight does not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy.”106
Importantly, the Seventh Circuit read “Riley and its progeny” as
maintaining “a common thread—they involve law enforcement officers
affirmatively accessing the content within cell phones to gather evidence against
arrestees.”107 Thus, the court held that no Fourth Amendment search had

102. Am. News & Info. Servs., 2014 WL 4681936, at *10 (citation omitted).
103. See, e.g., United States v. Brixen, 908 F.3d 276, 282 (7th Cir. 2018) (sending a Snapchat message to
the arrestee’s phone and viewing a contemporaneous receipt notification on the lock screen did not constitute a
search); United States v. Lawing, 703 F.3d 229, 238 (4th Cir. 2012) (calling a suspect’s number twice and
hearing the suspect’s phone ring both times did not constitute a search).
104. Brixen, 908 F.3d at 281 (emphasis added) (“[The officer’s] actions simply do not amount to a search
of Brixen’s cell phone. He did not open or otherwise manipulate Brixen’s phone. Nor did he gain access to any
of the phone’s content or attempt to retrieve any information from within the phone.”); Lawing, 703 F.3d at 238
(“The police did not attempt to retrieve any information from within the phone.”).
105. Brixen, 908 F.3d at 279.
106. Id. at 282.
107. Id. at 281 (emphasis added).
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occurred because the detective merely “watched the phone . . . as a Snapchat
notification appeared on the screen” and “did not access any content within
Brixen’s phone, nor did he manipulate the phone in any way before he obtained
a search warrant.”108 In sum, “since the phone’s content was not affirmatively
accessed by law enforcement officers, no search occurred.”109
In comparison to these cases, in which officers have sent signals to an
arrestee’s phone, the Canadian cases discussed in Part I.B.4 generally address
situations where officers view incriminating information—sent by a third
party—on the lock screen of a phone. As in these Canadian cases, the plain-view
exception is relevant in the United States. Indeed, although it did not conduct an
explicit plain-view analysis, the Brixen court rested its holding on the fact that
the investigating officer in that case “only witnessed what was in plain view.”110
Under U.S. law, the “plain-view” doctrine holds that
if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its
incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a
lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant. If,
however, the police lack probable cause to believe that an object in plain view
is contraband without conducting some further search of the object—i.e., if
“its incriminating character [is not] ‘immediately apparent’”—the plain-view
doctrine cannot justify its seizure.111

Thus, if the police observe information—such as a text message—on the
lock screen of an arrestee’s phone, for example, they would be justified in
seizing the phone on the basis of the plain-view doctrine only if the
“incriminating character” of the observed information “is immediately
apparent.”112 A subsequent search of the device, however, would generally
require a warrant. In such cases, according to the Supreme Court, “the seizure
of an object in plain view does not involve an intrusion on privacy.”113 Some
courts have interpreted this rule cautiously in the context of police searches of
digital data, especially given the privacy-friendly language in cases like Riley.114
Unsurprisingly, post-Riley search-incident-to-arrest cases cover a broad
range of factual and legal contexts, as lower courts have had to apply the broad
reasoning of Riley to a variety of factual scenarios. Across circuits, decisions
have not always been consistent and new decisions are being published very
frequently, making it impossible to make up-to-date, generalizable statements
about the current state of the law. Notably, however, these lower courts have
both expanded Riley’s privacy-related protections beyond smartphones (for
108. Id. at 279.
109. Id. at 282.
110. Id.
111. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136 (1990)).
112. Id.
113. Horton, 496 U.S. at 141.
114. For example, the Colorado Supreme Court has held that “the plain view exception to the warrant
requirement must be applied cautiously in situations involving digital data.” People v. Davis, 438 P.3d 266, 271
(Colo. 2019) (interpreting its prior holding in People v. Herrera, 357 P.3d 1227, 1233–34 (Colo. 2015)).
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example, applying SCOTUS’s reasoning to cases involving laptop computers
and digital cameras) and enumerated exceptions or limitations to Riley’s holding
(for example, based on diminished expectations of privacy). Decisions limiting
Riley’s applicability have focused on the legal status of the device owner (for
example, a probationer), the visibility of the information on the phone’s lock
screen (something akin to the plain-view exception), and the level of active
manipulation of the phone by the police.
B. CANADA
1. Overview of the Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine
In Canada, police searches are largely regulated by Section 8 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (although statutory law also provides
the police power to search).115 The intent of Section 8 is to “protect individuals
from unjustified state intrusions upon their privacy.”116 In doing so, Section 8
also protects “the underlying values of dignity, integrity and autonomy.”117
The Supreme Court of Canada has differentiated between three types of
privacy protected by Section 8: personal, territorial, and informational.
According to the Court, the Charter protects informational privacy by seeking
“to protect a biographical core of personal information which individuals in a
free and democratic society would wish to maintain and control from
dissemination to the state. This would include information which tends to reveal
intimate details of the lifestyle and personal choices of the individual.”118
In determining whether any search is reasonable, the Supreme Court of
Canada analyzes whether the contested “police activity invades a reasonable
expectation of privacy.”119 Examining the totality of the circumstances, this
involves a two-step test for determining whether subjective expectations of
privacy are objectively reasonable, fashioned after the test proposed by Justice
Harlan of the United States Supreme Court in Katz v. United States.120 All
warrantless searches are prima facie unreasonable.121 As in the United States,
warrantless searches incident to arrest have become the “majority of searches
actually conducted by the police” in Canada, even though intended to be an
“exception rather than the rule.”122

115. STEPHEN COUGHLAN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 93 (2008).
116. Id. at 62.
117. R. v. Plant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281, 293 (Can.).
118. Id. (emphasis added).
119. R. v. Wise, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 527, 533 (Can.).
120. R. v. Edwards, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 128, para. 45 (Can.); see also R. v. Tessling, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432, para.
19 (Can.).
121. COUGHLAN, supra note 115, at 81.
122. Id. at 97; see also Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382 (2014) (“‘[E]xception’ is something of a
misnomer in this context, as warrantless searches incident to arrest occur with far greater frequency than searches
conducted pursuant to a warrant.”).
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Much like the Fourth Amendment in the United States, Section 8 prohibits
agents of the state from conducting unreasonable searches or seizures.123 In
exception to this general rule, Canadian “police have a common law power to
search incident to a lawful arrest,”124 a power developed to promote efficiency
in criminal investigations125 and justified by the state’s interest in protecting the
safety of officers and others.126
At its core, a search incident to arrest is legitimate when the underlying
arrest is lawful, the search is truly incidental to the underlying arrest, and the
search was conducted in a reasonable manner.127 According to the Supreme
Court of Canada, “[t]his means, simply put, that the search is only justifiable
if the purpose of the search is related to the purpose of the arrest.”128
Additionally, and in contrast to the U.S. position in Robinson that the search is
justified by the fact of the arrest itself, in Canada “the police officer’s motives
and purposes for the search” are central to the question of whether the search is
lawful.129 “That is, not only must a valid purpose objectively exist, but
subjectively the officer must have made an individualized decision to conduct
the search for that purpose,” otherwise the search is not truly incidental to the
arrest.130 Like in Robinson, a valid arrest gives the officer the power to search
(without any additional showing of suspicion or cause); however, in Canada, the
officer must also be able to explain the purpose of the search and how it related
to the arrest.131 There are three valid purposes: ensuring the safety of police
officers or others, preventing the destruction of evidence, and discovering
evidence (although, “[t]here remains some ambiguity in the case law over
whether this third purpose relates to any evidence or is restricted to evidence that
may go out of existence if the search was delayed”).132
The search-incident-to-arrest exception can refer to either items (for
example, a cigarette pack) or places (for example, automobiles) to be searched
(including the area surrounding the arrestee). “The central guiding principle is
that the search must be, as the case law puts it, truly incidental to the arrest.”133
However, some particularly invasive searches, such as taking bodily samples,

123. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to
the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.), § 8 (“Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or
seizure.”).
124. R. v. Fearon, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 621, para. 1 (Can.).
125. Id. at para. 16 (“The cases teach us that the power to search incident to arrest is a focussed power given
to the police so that they can pursue their investigations promptly upon making an arrest.”); R. v. Beare, [1988]
2 S.C.R. 387, 404 (Can.) (The exception exists “to arm the police with adequate and reasonable powers for the
investigation of crime” and because “[p]romptitude and facility in the identification and the discovery of indicia
of guilt or innocence are of great importance in criminal investigations”).
126. COUGHLAN, supra note 115, at 85 (citing R. v. Caslake, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 51, para. 17 (Can.)).
127. Id. at 98.
128. Caslake, 1 S.C.R. at para. 17.
129. COUGHLAN, supra note 115, at 99.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 102 (citing Caslake, 1 S.C.R. at para. 25).
132. Id. at 100.
133. R. v. Fearon, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 621, para. 16 (Can.).
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are not allowed incident to arrest, as they would constitute a “an ‘affront to
human dignity.’”134 Although the power to search incident to arrest does, in
some cases, allow officers to search a room, building, or vehicle in the
immediate vicinity of the arrestee, the Court of Appeal for Ontario (the highest
court in the province) has held that such a power only extends to an arrestee’s
home in exceptional circumstances, due to the arrestee’s heightened privacy
interest in their home.135
In R. v. Fearon, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that the permissibility
of a search conducted incident to arrest was dependent on “the nature of items
seized, the place of search and the time of search in relation to the time of
arrest.”136 Thus, “the permissible scope of searches incident to arrest will be
affected by the particular circumstances of the particular arrest.”137 In Cloutier
v. Langlois, the Supreme Court of Canada noted the purposes for which a search
incident to arrest was lawful under the Charter, reaffirming the rule that “the
police have a power to search a lawfully arrested person and to seize anything
in his or her possession or immediate surroundings to guarantee the safety of the
police and the accused, prevent the prisoner’s escape or provide evidence against
him.”138
2. Searching Cellphones Incident to Arrest Prior to Fearon
A number of Supreme Court of Canada cases have dealt with the search
and seizure of computers or cellphones in a variety of search contexts. In R. v.
Vu, for example, the court held that a search warrant for a home cannot extend
to searching computers inside the home (if not specified in the warrant) on the
traditional theory that receptacles (for example, cupboards and drawers) could
be searched, because personal computers should be “treated . . . as a separate
place” to be searched, and should require a separate warrant.139
Prior to the SCC’s 2014 decision in R. v. Fearon, Canadian courts had not
uniformly applied the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine to cellphone searches.
In fact, in Fearon, the Supreme Court of Canada identified four different
approaches taken by the lower courts. First, some lower courts had allowed
cellphone searches incident to arrest—but only “provided that the search is truly
incidental to the arrest.”140 Second, at least one decision allowed only “cursory”
134. Caslake, 1 S.C.R. at para. 15 (citing R. v. Stillman, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607, para. 42 (Can.)).
135. R. v. Golub, [1997] 34 O.R. (3d) 743, para. 41 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (“[S]earches of a home as an incident
of an arrest, like entries of a home to effect an arrest, are now generally prohibited subject to exceptional
circumstances where the law enforcement interest is so compelling that it overrides the individual’s right to
privacy within the home.”); see also COUGHLAN, supra note 115, at 98.
136. Fearon, 3 S.C.R. at para. 13 (citing Caslake, 1 S.C.R. at paras. 15–16).
137. Id.
138. Id. at para. 18 (quoting Cloutier v. Langlois, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 158, 180–81 (Can.)).
139. R. v. Vu, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 657, paras. 48–52 (Can.).
140. Fearon, 3 S.C.R. at para. 2 (citing R. v. Giles, 2007 BCSC 1147, paras. 54–55, 62 (Can.); R. v. OtchereBadu, 2010 ONSC 1059, paras. 81, 83 (Can.); Young v. Canada, 2010 CarswellNfld 388, para. 45 (Can. Nfld.
L. Prov. Ct.) (WL); R. v. Howell, 2011 NSSC 284, para. 33 (Can.); R. v. Franko, 2012 ABQB 282, para. 157
(Can.); R. v. Cater, 2014 NSCA 74, para. 161 (Can.); R. v. D’Annunzio, (2010) 224 C.R.R. (2d) 221, paras. 23–
24 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.)).
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searches of cellphones.141 Third, at least two cases held that “thorough ‘datadump’ searches are not permitted incident to arrest.”142 Fourth, at least one case
held that cellphone searches were not permitted at all, “except in exigent
circumstances, in which a ‘cursory’ search is permissible.”143
In these cases, courts were frequently confronted with arguments that
expanding the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine to cellphones (and similar
computing devices) would infringe arrestees’ “high informational privacy
interests”144 in such devices. According to the defense counsel in one of these
cases, “the capacity of electronic storage media to store vast quantities of
information creates the potential for large-scale invasions of privacy.”145
However, judges were not always convinced. In a decision among the first set
of cases, one trial judge held that a search through emails on the arrestee’s phone
for the limited purpose of securing evidence related to the underlying crime did
not raise reasonable privacy expectations that were “different in nature from
what might be disclosed by searching a notebook, a briefcase or a purse found
in the same circumstances.”146 Another also found that the search of an unlocked
and unencrypted phone raises lesser privacy concerns than a search of an
encrypted and password-protected phone.147
In the other three sets of cases, courts restricted the ability of police to
search incident to arrest to varying degrees. In these cases (and other cases
dealing with searches of cellphones outside the search-incident-to-arrest
context), judges often focused on the informational privacy interests at stake.148
In R. v. Polius, for example, the judge ruled that a person maintains a “reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contents of his/her cell phone” because “[t]he
information in a cell phone, computer or other electronic device may relate to
aspects of life that are deeply personal.”149 The court held that “the power to
seize a cell phone during a [search incident to arrest] where there is reason to
believe it may afford evidence of the crime does not include a power to examine
141. Id. (citing R. v. Polius, (2009) 196 C.R.R. (2d) 288, para. 41 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.)).
142. Id. (first citing R. v. Hiscoe, 2013 NSCA 48, paras. 68–69 (Can.); and then citing R. v. Mann, 2014
BCCA 231, paras. 118–19 (Can.)).
143. Id. (citing R. v. Liew, 2012 ONSC 1826, paras. 124, 144 (Can.)).
144. R. v. Giles, 2007 BCSC 1147, para. 52 (Can.).
145. Id. at para. 49.
146. Id. at para. 6; see also R. v. Otchere-Badu, 2010 ONSC 1059, paras. 84–87 (Can.) (holding that even
if a search of a cell phone incident to arrest violated the Charter, the breach was “minimal” and not one that
would undermine the reliability or admissibility of the evidence obtained).
147. Young v. Canada, 2010 CarswellNfld 388, para. 40 (Can. Nfld. L. Prov. Ct.) (WL).
148. See, e.g., R. v. Mann, 2014 BCCA 231, para. 118 (Can.) (“It seems to me that downloading the entire
contents of a cell phone or smartphone, like the BlackBerrys in this case, seized on the arrest of the accused,
after some delay, without a search warrant, can no longer be considered valid under s. 8 of the Charter as a
reasonable warrantless search. The highly invasive nature of these searches exceeds the permissible scope for a
warrantless search authorized under the common law as a search incident to arrest.”); R. v. Polius, (2009) 196
C.R.R. (2d) 288, para. 52 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); R. v. T.O., 2010 ONCJ 334, paras. 32–46 (Can.) (WL) (“[T]he
Applicant maintained a subjective and objective reasonable expectation of privacy in the photos” found on his
cell phone.); R. v. Little, 2009 CarswellOnt 8024, para.147 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (WL) (finding that cell phones
raise the same privacy interests as typical computers for search purposes).
149. Polius, 196 C.R.R. (2d) at para. 52.

November 2020]

LIMITS ON SMARTPHONE SEARCHES

251

the contents of the cell phone without a prior judicial authorization, absent
exigent circumstances.”150
The judge also analogized a cellphone to a “locked briefcase,” stating that
“[a] cell phone is the functional equivalent of a locked briefcase in today’s
technologically sophisticated world.”151 Other cases equated cellphones with
traditional computers.152 This is meaningful, because the Supreme Court of
Canada has held that “[i]t is difficult to imagine a search more intrusive,
extensive, or invasive of one’s privacy than the search and seizure of a personal
computer.”153 This line of cases led the high court of British Columbia to find
(just a few months prior to the Supreme Court’s judgment in Fearon) that “the
law as it stands today no longer permits police to conduct warrantless searches
of the entire contents of an individual’s cell phone.”154
In Fearon, police arrested Fearon and an associate on suspicion of
committing robbery. At the time of his arrest, officers conducted a pat-down
search of his person, found a cellphone in his pocket, and conducted a cursory
search of the phone.155 Police also searched his phone again within the next
couple of hours. During these searches, police discovered two relevant photos
and “a draft text message referring to jewellery and opening with the words ‘We
did it.’”156 Fearon argued at trial and on appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal
that the search of his phone violated his rights under Section 8 of the Charter.
Both the trial judge and the Ontario Court of Appeals disagreed.
The trial judge found that the arresting officer “was justified in his belief
that the cell phone may contain evidence relevant to the armed robbery for which
Mr. Fearon was being arrested” and that “there was a reasonable prospect of
securing evidence of the offence for which the accused was being arrested in
searching the contents of the cell phone.”157 The judge distinguished this initial
150. Id. at para. 34.
151. Id. at para. 47.
152. R. v. Hiscoe, 2013 NSCA 48, para. 40 (Can.) (“[T]he cell phone in this case was described as akin to
a mini-computer capable of storing many gigabytes not unlike personal or home computers . . . .”).
153. R. v. Morelli, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 253, paras. 2, 105 (Can.) (“Computers often contain our most intimate
correspondence. They contain the details of our financial, medical, and personal situations. They even reveal our
specific interests, likes, and propensities, recording in the browsing history and cache files the information we
seek out and read, watch, or listen to on the Internet.”); see also R. v. Cole, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 34, para. 47 (Can.)
(“Computers that are used for personal purposes, regardless of where they are found or to whom they belong,
‘contain the details of our financial, medical, and personal situations.’ This is particularly the case where, as
here, the computer is used to browse the Web. Internet-connected devices ‘reveal our specific interests, likes,
and propensities, recording in the browsing history and cache files the information we seek out and read, watch,
or listen to on the Internet.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Morelli, 1 S.C.R. at para. 105)).
154. R. v. Mann, 2014 BCCA 231, para. 123 (Can.). However, the court did not rule as to the legitimacy of
so-called “cursory” searches incident to arrest. Id.
155. R. v. Fearon, 2010 ONCJ 645, paras. 19–22 (Can.). Upon finishing the pat down, the arresting officer
“‘had a look through the cell phone, saw some things in that cell phone, and seized it at that point in time as
evidence in relation to the investigation’. He could not recall specifics, but believed that he found some photos
in the cell phone at the time, including photos of males and a photo of a gun. . . . He explained that he
manipulated the keypad to the extent that he entered into different modes to access text messages and
photographs on the phone.” Id. at para. 21–22.
156. R. v. Fearon, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 621, para. 8 (Can.).
157. Fearon, 2010 ONCJ at paras. 43–44.
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search of Fearon’s phone from the search conducted in Polius on the grounds
that the officer in the earlier case “did not have a reasonable basis to believe that
the cell phone may have been evidence of the alleged murder when he arrested
the accused.”158 The judge dismissed the defendant’s arguments that phones
should be excluded from the search incident to arrest power due to their capacity
to store large amounts of personal information, stating
While there is no doubt that cell phones can contain significant amounts
of personal information, the evidence in this case does not lead to the
conclusion that Mr. Fearon had an extraordinarily high expectation of privacy
in this phone. . . . There is no evidence that the phone was password protected
or subject to any security barriers. Nor is there any evidence that it had “minicomputer” capabilities like [phones in earlier cases].159

The judge found it particularly persuasive that “[t]he cell phone in this
case . . . was not ‘locked’ and had no password protection or other security walls
on it.”160 Concluding, the trial judge stated that
In my view, an ordinary cell phone objectively commands a measure of
privacy in its contents. However, the expectation of privacy in the information
contained in the cell phone is more akin to what might be disclosed by
searching a purse, a wallet, a notebook or briefcase found in the same
circumstances. The evidence in this case is that the LG cell phone appears to
have had the functions of cell phone operation, text messaging, photographs
and contact lists. While certainly private, the information stored is not so
connected to the dignity of the person that this court should create an exception
to the police ability to search for evidence when truly incidental to arrest and
carried out in a reasonable manner.161

On appeal, the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s findings,
affirming the reasonableness of the search and the officers’ conclusion that
evidence of the robbery might be found on the phone.162 The court noted that
they would have found the subsequent searches of the phone at the police station
to be attenuated from the arrest, but that they would not overrule the trial judge’s
findings that those searches were still incidental to the arrest.163 At a more
general level, the court was also unwilling to announce a new rule carving
cellphones out of the search-incident-to-arrest power, despite “the highly
personal and sensitive nature of the contents of a cell phone and the high
158. Id. at para. 45.
159. Id. at para. 49.
160. Id. at para. 50.
161. Id. at para. 51.
162. R. v. Fearon, 2013 ONCA 106, para. 47 (Can.) (“The police had information that the appellant had
acted with a second person and that a third person was involved in the stashing of the stolen jewellery. There
was therefore a potential for communication among the three suspected participants. In addition, the police had
a legitimate concern about the location of the gun and the stolen jewellery. Any communication among the three
suspects could lead to the discovery of one or both. In respect of the photographs found in the cell phone, the
police knew from experience that robbers will sometimes take photos of the stolen property and even of
themselves with the loot.”).
163. Id. at para. 58.
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expectation of privacy that they may attract.”164 In particular, the court reiterated
findings from the trial court, stating that “it is significant that the cell phone was
apparently not password protected or otherwise ‘locked’ to users other than the
appellant when it was seized”165—if it had been, the court noted, police would
then need to acquire a warrant prior to conducting a search.166
3. Fearon at the Supreme Court
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada held that warrantless searches of
cellphones incident to lawful arrests comply with Section 8 of the Charter only
when: (1) the arrest is lawful; (2) the search is truly incidental to the arrest and
is conducted for the purpose of protecting the police, the accused, or the public,
or to preserve or discover evidence; (3) the nature and the extent of the search
are tailored to the purpose of the search; and (4) the police take detailed notes of
what they have examined on the device and how it was searched.167 In doing so,
the Court held that the searches conducted in the case were consistent with the
existing common law power to search incident to arrest but that the law needed
to be modified to ensure it stayed consistent with the Charter.168
In its analysis, the Court found that “cell phone searches incidental to arrest
may serve important law enforcement objectives,” including interests that
surpass those of other types of searches in their importance to the state.169
However, privacy interests were also heightened; indeed, “the search of cell
phones, like the search of computers, implicates important privacy interests
which are different in both nature and extent from the search of other
‘places.’”170 The court also rejected analogizing cellphones to other types of
containers searchable upon arrest (including briefcases or documents):
It is unrealistic to equate a cell phone with a briefcase or document found in
someone’s possession at the time of arrest. . . . [C]omputers—and I would add
cell phones—may have immense storage capacity, may generate information
about intimate details of the user’s interests, habits and identity without the
knowledge or intent of the user, may retain information even after the user
thinks that it has been destroyed, and may provide access to information that
is in no meaningful sense “at” the location of the search.171

164. Id. at para. 72.
165. Id. at para. 73.
166. Id. at para. 75.
167. R. v. Fearon, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 621, para. 83 (Can.). Subsequently, lower courts have referred to these
four requirements as the “Fearon criteria.” See infra note 186 and accompanying text.
168. Id. at paras. 43, 58 (“[M]y view is that the general common law framework for searches incident to
arrest needs to be modified in the case of cell phone searches incident to arrest. In particular, the law needs to
provide the suspect with further protection against the risk of wholesale invasion of privacy which may occur if
the search of a cell phone is constrained only by the requirements that the arrest be lawful and that the search be
truly incidental to arrest and reasonably conducted.”).
169. Id. at para. 49.
170. Id. at para. 51 (quoting R. v. Vu, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 657, paras. 38, 40–45 (Can.)).
171. Id. (citing Vu, 3 S.C.R. at paras. 41–44).
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The Court also held that the individual capabilities of a cellphone, whether
basic or advanced, should not be a determining factor and that the same test
should be applied to both unsophisticated cellphones and smartphones (as well
as “other devices that are the equivalent of computers”).172 The Court also
largely rejected findings from the lower courts that the use of passwords was
tied to the level of privacy interests an accused might have in the phone. “An
individual’s decision not to password protect his or her cell phone does not
indicate any sort of abandonment of the significant privacy interests one
generally will have in the contents of the phone. Cell phones—locked or
unlocked—engage significant privacy interests.”173
However, the Court found that cellphone searches did not engage the same
level of privacy intrusion as extracting bodily samples or conducting a strip
search. While those sorts of searches “are invariably and inherently very great
invasions of privacy and are, in addition, a significant affront to human dignity,”
cell phone searches are not.174 According to the Court,
while cell phone searches—especially searches of “smart phones”, which are
the functional equivalent of computers—may constitute very significant
intrusions of privacy, not every search is inevitably a significant intrusion.
Suppose, for example, that in the course of the search in this case, the police
had looked only at the unsent text message and the photo of the handgun. The
invasion of privacy in those circumstances would, in my view, be minimal. So
we must keep in mind that the real issue is the potentially broad invasion of
privacy that may, but not inevitably will, result from law enforcement searches
of cell phones.175

The Court rejected a categorical prohibition on warrantless cell phone
searches incident to arrest of the kind announced in Riley, finding that it was
possible to “impose meaningful limits on the purposes, threshold and manner of
such searches.”176 In the case at hand, the Court found that the initial search of
Fearon’s phone violated the Charter, due to the fact that the prosecution could
not provide “detailed evidence about precisely what was searched, how and
why”177—evidence needed to meet the modified test announced by the Court
(discussed at the beginning of this Subpart). However, the Court still ruled that
the evidence obtained from the search should be admissible.178

172. Id. at para. 52 (“We should not differentiate among different cellular devices based on their particular
capacities when setting the general framework for the search power. So, for example, the same general
framework for determining the legality of the search incident to arrest should apply to the relatively
unsophisticated cellular telephone in issue in this case as it would to other devices that are the equivalent of
computers.”).
173. Id. at para. 53 (citation omitted).
174. Id. at para. 55.
175. Id. at para. 54.
176. Id. at para. 63.
177. Id. at para. 87.
178. Id. at para. 98. It did so on the grounds that the search was conducted reasonably and in good faith, the
evidence obtained was “cogent and reliable,” and that Fearon’s privacy interests were diminished somewhat on
the facts of this specific case. Id. at paras. 95–97.
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In determining whether a search of a cell phone is incidental to an arrest,
the Court stated that,
[b]oth the nature and the extent of the search performed on the cell phone must
be truly incidental to the particular arrest for the particular offence. In practice,
this will mean that, generally, even when a cell phone search is permitted
because it is truly incidental to the arrest, only recently sent or drafted emails,
texts, photos and the call log may be examined as in most cases only those
sorts of items will have the necessary link to the purposes for which prompt
examination of the device is permitted.179

In dissent, Justice Karakatsanis (joined by Justices LeBel and Abella)
emphasized the significant privacy interests that individuals have in relation to
their computers and smartphones, the search of which can allow the police to
see through the “windows to our inner private lives.”180 Indeed, the dissenting
Justices noted, “[o]ur digital footprint is often enough to reconstruct the events
of our lives, our relationships with others, our likes and dislikes, our fears, hopes,
opinions, beliefs and ideas.”181 Therefore, “as technology changes, our law must
also evolve so that modern mobile devices do not become the telescreens of
George Orwell’s 1984.”182 In contrast to the majority opinion, Justice
Karakatsanis argued that cell phone searches were akin to searches of homes or
taking bodily samples: “In my view, searches of personal digital devices risk
similarly serious encroachments on privacy.”183
In conclusion, Justice Karakatsanis argued that the evidence should have
been excluded. He wrote,
the high privacy interest individuals have in their electronic devices tips the
balance in favour of exclusion. Judicial pre-authorization is an essential
bulwark against unjustified infringements of individual privacy. Unwarranted
searches undermine the public’s confidence that personal communications,
ideas and beliefs will be protected on their digital devices. This is particularly
important given the increasing use and ubiquity of such technology. It is
difficult to conceive of a sphere of privacy more intensely personal—or indeed
more pervasive—than that found in an individual’s personal digital device or
computer. To admit evidence obtained in breach of this particularly strong
privacy interest, one of concern to an ever-increasing majority of Canadians,
would tend to bring the administration of justice into disrepute.184

4. Post-Fearon Case Law
Since 2014, lower courts have applied the Fearon test in a variety of
contexts and involving cursory and more detailed searches of arrestees’ cell

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at para. 76.
Id. at para. 101 (Karakatsanis, J., dissenting).
Id. (Karakatsanis, J., dissenting).
Id. at para. 102 (Karakatsanis, J., dissenting).
Id. at para. 104 (Karakatsanis, J., dissenting).
Id. at para. 197 (Karakatsanis, J., dissenting).
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phones.185 Courts have referred to the four primary requirements laid out in
Fearon as the “Fearon criteria.”186 Courts have applied these criteria in cases
involving cellphones and smartphones of various sorts, as well as computers,
tablets,187 USB flash drives,188 and GoPro cameras.189 One general takeaway
from Fearon that pervades many subsequent cases is the notion that,
[f]rom Fearon we also learn that police are not entitled to navigate through
unsettled areas of the law by following the least burdensome route. As a
general rule, faced with genuine uncertainty, police should err on the side of
caution by settling on a course of action that is more, rather than less respectful
of the accused’s privacy rights.190

As in the United States, some Canadian courts have also made distinctions
between searches that involve merely viewing a phone’s screen and those that
involve manipulation of the phone to view additional contents. In the words of
one trial court judge in British Columbia, “[i]t is, in my view, one thing to pick
up such a device and to see on an open and visible screen a text conversation. It
is quite another to do an in-depth analysis of all of the content.”191 While
“picking up the phone and seeing an open screen and visible conversation” might
be “no different than picking up a document like a driver’s licence or a letter or
a note of some sort,” manipulating the phone to search through its contents is
much more invasive.192 Another trial court judge found that activating a phone’s
screen to see if it was locked or to prevent the phone from reverting to a locked
state was minimally invasive, while searching through the phone’s contents was
more “problematic.”193 In another, the fact that incriminating messages were
plainly visible on the unlocked screen of the arrestee’s phone supported the
185. See, e.g., R. v. Kossick, 2017 SKPC 67, para. 97 (Can.), aff’d on appeal, R. v. Kossick, 2018 SKCA
55 (Can.); R. v. Wasilewski, 2016 SKCA 112, paras. 25, 28 (Can.) (holding that the breach of Charter rights was
not serious, as law was unsettled at the time and the officer acted in good faith); R. v. Adeshina, 2015 SKCA 29,
paras. 27, 29 (Can.) (determining the same); R. v. Emery, 2019 BCSC 702, paras. 91–97 (Can.) (finding that a
search was in compliance with Fearon, and photographs of search were sufficient under the note-taking
requirement); R. v. Byrnes, 2019 ONSC 1287, para. 68 (Can.) (“[P]rivacy protections prohibit investigating cell
phones after a routine traffic stop absent extraordinary circumstances.”).
186. See, e.g., R. v. Ly, 2016 ABCA 229, para. 18 (Can.); Kossick, 2018 SKCA at para. 37.
187. R. v. Harder, 2017 ONCJ 280, para. 56–57 (Can.).
188. See, e.g., R. v. Villaroman, 2018 ABCA 220, para. 17 (Can.) (“Fearon . . . elevated the requirement to
take notes to a constitutional requirement in cases where a police officer searches an electronic device incident
to arrest.”) (citing Fearon, 3 S.C.R. at para. 82); R. v. Balendra, 2016 ONSC 5143, para. 49 (Can.) (“[T]he
search of a USB drive engages many of the same privacy considerations that apply to searches of personal
computers.”) (citing R. v. Tuduce, 2014 ONCA 547, para. 70 (Can.)), on appeal at R. v. Balendra, 2019 ONCA
68, paras. 39–52 (Can.) (applying the Fearon criteria to the search of a USB drive incident to arrest, but noting
that the note-taking requirement was not as important in this context); R. v. Mahamud, 2019 SKQB 115, para.
40 (Can.) (finding that the officer had not taken notes as required by Fearon); R. v. Armstrong and Courchene,
2016 MBQB 134, paras. 36, 45 (Can.) (finding the officers violated the note-taking requirement and that the
scope of their search was too broad).
189. R. v. Roy, 2016 ABPC 135, para. 22, 26 (Can.) (finding that a seizure incident to arrest and subsequent,
warranted search of camera was lawful).
190. R. v. Tsekouras, 2017 ONCA 290, para. 94 (Can.) (citing Fearon, 3 S.C.R. at para. 94).
191. R. v. Khosravi, 2018 BCSC 1791, para. 47 (Can.).
192. Id.
193. R. v. Roberto, 2018 ONSC 847, para. 13 (Can.).
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officers’ claim that the subsequent search of the phone was truly incidental to
arrest and was directed at preserving and discovering evidence of the crime
underlying the arrest.194
However, based on the assertion in Fearon that “both locked and unlocked
cell phones engage significant privacy interests,” one trial judge concluded that,
“Fearon does not appear to distinguish between a cursory viewing of cell phone
messages and those requiring some positive act on the part of the officer.”195
Thus, according to the judge, merely viewing full or partial messages on the lock
screen as they arrived could implicate Charter rights under Section 8.196
Additionally, the judge found that accessing the phone and searching through
recent instant messages was subject to the requirements for searches incident to
arrest under Fearon, regardless of whether the phone was password-protected.197
Indeed, according to the appellate court, when reviewing the trial court’s
judgment, applying the “plain view” exception to searches of cellphones is
fraught with difficulty, as “simply seeing the cellphone receive a number of
messages and reading the names of the persons who had sent them” on the lock
screen is often not enough to generate probable cause to seize the device, let
alone conduct a more exhaustive search without a warrant.198 Yet, in other cases,
courts have concluded that searches that involved short, focused examinations
of an arrestee’s smartphone for specific evidence were permissible,199 while
more exhaustive forensic analysis was not.200
In R. v. Marakah, the SCC was asked to determine when a claimant might
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a text message, even after it was sent
to a recipient (although this was not a search-incident-to-arrest case). The SCC
held that a suspect could challenge the warrantless search of the recipient’s cell
phone for messages sent by the suspect. This is so because the suspect can
maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in those messages.201 Interestingly,

194. R. v. Solano-Santana, 2018 ONSC 2609, para. 62–63 (Can.).
195. R. v. Kossick, 2017 SKPC 67, para. 86 (Can.) (citing Fearon, 3 S.C.R. at para. 53).
196. Id. (“The search by Cst. Parker in the patrol car, shortly after arrest, involved viewing complete or
partial messages as they were being received. The Crown argues those messages were in plain view and that the
officer’s conduct did not amount to a search subject to the criteria set out in Fearon. However, Fearon does not
appear to distinguish between a cursory viewing of cell phone messages and those requiring some positive act
on the part of the officer. For example, both locked and unlocked cell phones engage significant privacy
interests.” (citing Fearon, 3 S.C.R. at para. 53)).
197. Id.
198. R. v. Kossick, 2018 SKCA 55, para. 46 (Can.).
199. See, e.g., R. v. Bourdon, 2016 ONSC 2113, para. 383 (Can.) (“What they did not do is telling. They
did not answer the incoming call. They did not search to see what, if any, Internet sites had been accessed. They
did not read the texts. They did not look at the contacts. They investigated for camera capacity and Internet
access, and concluded that search within 3 minutes. Their search was similar to the example set out in para. 54
of Fearon. It is in accordance with para. 57 in that there was no routine browsing of the cell phone in an
unfocused way.”); R. v. Jones, 2015 SKPC 29, para. 62 (Can.) (“The officer performed only a cursory search
[limited to recent text messages] and did not stray into other areas or applications on the phone that would not
have yielded further evidence of an offence.”).
200. Jones, 2015 SKPC at para. 71 (finding that downloading and analyzing all content on a phone without
a warrant violated Fearon’s third criterion).
201. R. v. Marakah, [2017] 2 S.C.R. 608, para. 4 (Can.).
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the majority decision in Marakah defined the subject matter of the search at issue
not as the text message recipient’s smartphone, but rather the “electronic
conversation” of which the text messages were a part.202 The majority noted that
the “[Section] 8 analysis must be robust” to the reality that where messaging
“data are physically or electronically located varies from phone to phone, from
service provider to service provider, or, with text messaging more broadly, from
technology to technology.”203 Rather than simply looking at the search of a
smartphone itself, the Court examined a number of factors that speak to whether
the claimant held a reasonable expectation of privacy in the particular search at
issue in the case, including “the place where the search occurred . . . the private
nature of the subject matter” and whether the claimant maintained some “control
over the subject matter.”204 Refusing to limit the place of the search to its origins
as a physical, “territorial privacy interest,” the majority explained that,
an electronic conversation does not occupy a particular physical place. All or
part of it may be on the sender’s phone or the recipient’s, or in radio waves or
a service provider’s database, or on a remote server to which both the sender
and the recipient (or the recipients) have access, or some combination of these.
This interconnected web of devices and servers creates an electronic world of
digital communication that, in the 21st century, is every bit as real as physical
space. . . . Although electronic, these rooms are the place of the search.205

However, multiple courts have held that the privacy interest a suspect has
in their electronic device (and thus, the seriousness of the intrusion by police
during a search) is based on the type of information actually contained on the
device and accessible to the police, regardless of whether the device itself
“clearly ha[s] the potential to contain a great deal of personal information” due
to its technological capabilities (for example, storage capacity).206 As
summarized by one Ontario trial court, it is the “informational contents of a cell
phone” that give rise to the “important privacy interests” in these cases.207

202. Id. at para. 17 (“To describe text messages as part of an electronic conversation is to take a holistic
view of the subject matter of the search. This properly avoids a mechanical approach that defines the subject
matter in terms of physical acts, spaces, or modalities of transmission. It also reflects the technological reality
of text messaging.” (citation omitted)).
203. Id. at para. 19.
204. Id. at para. 24.
205. Id. at para. 28. This is also similar in some regards to language in the Fearon decision, that “[i]t is well
settled that the search of cell phones, like the search of computers, implicates important privacy interests which
are different in both nature and extent from the search of other ‘places.’” R. v. Fearon, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 621, para.
51 (Can.) (quoting R. v. Vu, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 657, paras. 38, 40–45 (Can.)).
206. R. v. Balendra, 2019 ONCA 68, para. 72 (Can.); R. v. Ranglin, 2016 ONSC 3972, para. 99 (Can.)
(“The only items found on the Blackberry were photographs and five audio recordings. While this information
is nevertheless confidential personal information, this limited information obtained by the police, was a limited
invasion of privacy which is a factor putting this breach at the middle or lower end of the spectrum.”).
207. R. v. Bourdon, 2016 ONSC 2113, para. 358 (Can.).
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C. NETHERLANDS 208
1. Overview of the Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine
In the Netherlands, the power of the police to conduct searches incident to
arrest is tied inherently to the powers of the police to seize objects, which are
spread across different statutory provisions regulating searches. As the
following overview shows, in comparison to the common law systems in the
United States and Canada, the Dutch civil law system is characterized by a
detailed set of statutory rules that regulate a variety of search-related conduct
(including but also expanding well beyond searches incident to arrest). Dutch
law regulates different types of frisks,209 but for the purposes of this Article, the
main forms of clothes and body searches are most relevant.
The investigation of clothes has various forms. The least intrusive is
frisking for identification purposes (identificatiefouillering): investigating
officers who stop or arrest a suspect have the power to search the suspect’s
clothes as well as the objects he or she is carrying at the time, at least insofar as
necessary to establish the suspect’s identity.210 If necessary for identifying the
suspect, police may also search handbags, suitcases, backpacks, or the personal
items in a car—including searching the car’s glovebox.211
More intrusive is the frisking for investigation purposes
(opsporingsfouillering), which is regulated in the same provision as the
investigation on the body.212 The prosecutor or assistant prosecutor can order an
investigation of the clothes or on the body in the interest of the investigation;
this is only allowed in cases of “serious objections” (ernstige bezwaren), a term
indicating a higher level of suspicion than a “reasonable suspicion” (redelijke
verdenking, a standard that is similar to probable cause): there must be a high
likelihood that the suspect has committed the offense for which he was
detained.213 Also, investigators can examine an arrested suspect’s clothes in
cases of serious objections, but they are not allowed to search on the body.214
The most intrusive is a search in the body, which we leave aside here since
smartphones are (at least now or in the near future) not to be found inside bodies.
For the purposes of this Article, the most relevant question is whether and
to what extent law enforcement officers can search (the contents of) objects they
208. This Part is partly based on Bert-Jaap Koops, Criminal Investigation and Privacy in Dutch Law (TILT
L. & Tech., Working Paper No. 21, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2837483.
209. See Politiewet 2012 [Police Act 2012] (wet van 12 juli 2012, Stb. 2012, 315), art. 7, paras. 3, 5
(regulating safety or security frisks (veiligheidsfouillering) and searches on the body of detainees); id. at art. 9,
paras. 4–5 (regulating frisks of persons to be detained (insluitingsfouillering)); Gemeentewet [Municipality Act]
(wet van 14 februari 1992, Stb. 1992, 96), art. 151b and 174b (regulating frisking in so-called “safety risk areas”).
210. Art. 55b, para. 1 SV (Neth.).
211. HR 31 mei 2011, ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BP6043 (Neth.).
212. Art. 56, para. 1. SV; Instellingsbesluit Commissie modernisering opsporingsonderzoek in het digitale
tijdperk [Decree Establishing the Committee on Modernizing Criminal Investigations in the Digital Age], 12 juli
2017, Stcrt. 2017, No. 39081, https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0039770/2018-01-01 (Neth.).
213. G.J.M. CORSTENS & M.J. BORGERS, HET NEDERLANDS STRAFPROCESRECHT [THE DUTCH CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE LAW] 578 (8th ed. 2014).
214. Art. 56, para. 4, SV (Neth.).
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have seized in the context of a clothes or body search. This question is
particularly relevant to smartphones that are seized by investigation officers in
circumstances that do not require authorization from a prosecutor or judge. The
traditional doctrinal answer to this question is simple: it is inherent to the seizure
power—and implicitly embedded in the provisions on seizable items and seizure
of goods incident to arrest215—that seized objects can be investigated in order to
bring to light the truth.216 Traces on the object (for example, fingerprints) may
be secured, and their contents may be investigated. Absent a specific rule that
indicates otherwise, this general rule would also apply to smartphones, laptops,
and other computer devices.
2. Searching Cell Phones Incident to Arrest Prior to the “Smartphone
Judgment”
Until relatively recently, Dutch law followed the doctrine that computers
simply were part of the traditional doctrine that the rules on seizure implicitly
allow searching contents of seized objects.217 However, as smartphones grew in
functionalities and data-processing capacities, questions arose whether it was
acceptable to legitimate the privacy interference of computer searches incident
to arrest implicitly on the basis of general rules without particular safeguards.
The under-regulation of these searches (in particular, searches of smartphones)
led to a split in lower courts’ case law. While courts had been following the
traditional rule, in 2015, the Court of Appeal Arnhem-Leeuwarden passed a
forcefully formulated verdict breaking with this line.218 They determined that a
police investigation of a seized smartphone violates article 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR):219
The seizure, investigation of the smartphone and the copying of data from the
smartphone by the police on the basis of art. 94 CCP infringe the right to
protection of privacy established in article 8 ECHR. The police competence
to infringe this right must written down in the law in a sufficiently knowable
and foreseeable manner.
The technological developments current in 2015 imply that a smartphone does
not only provide access to traffic data, but also to the contents of
communications and private information of the smartphone’s user. And this
without any form of prior assessment of the subsidiarity and/or proportionality
of the competence. This leads the court of appeal to determine that this is such
an intrusive competence that, also taking into account art. 1 CCP [the legality
principle], the general description of the competence of article 94 CCP can
215. Art. 94 SV (Neth.) (defining which items can be seized in the context of criminal procedure); Art. 95
SV (Neth.) (regulating seizure of goods incident to arrest).
216. CORSTENS & BORGERS, supra note 213, at 541.
217. HR 29 maart 1994, ECLI:NL:HR:1994:AD2076 (Neth.); HR 20 februari 2007, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:
AZ3564 (Neth.).
218. Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 22 april 2015, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2015:2954 (Neth.).
219. COUNCIL OF EUR., EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN R IGHTS art. 8 (establishing the right to
protection of private and family life, home and correspondence, and requiring interferences with this right to be
foreseeable by law and necessary in a democratic society).
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nowadays no longer be deemed to be a legislative precept that can be deemed
sufficiently knowable and foreseeable when exercising the competence.
Therefore, it cannot (any longer) pass the test of article 8 ECHR. The court
therefore agrees with the defence that the investigation by the police of the
smartphone’s contents violates his right to privacy.220

This judgment was quoted and followed by the District Court NoordHolland.221 However, a mere three weeks later, and without much argument, a
different section of the same court stuck to the old doctrine, considering a police
search of a smartphone incident to arrest to be lawful under the existing seizure
provisions.222 The District Courts of Oost-Brabant and Limburg also upheld the
existing doctrine that article 94 CCP provides a sufficient basis for warrantless
investigations of a seized smartphone.223 The divergence in case law caused
considerable legal uncertainty for law enforcement authorities, so that—in the
absence of legislative reform, which would be the normal route in the Dutch
civil law system to change the doctrine but would likely take years—a judgment
by the Supreme Court was eagerly awaited.
3. The “Smartphone Judgment” at the Supreme Court
On April 4, 2017, the Dutch Supreme Court passed three judgments on
smartphone searches incident to arrest, which contained the same—extensive—
general reasoning, only differing in minor details based on the application to the
facts of each case.224 Collectively, these judgments have become known as “the
smartphone judgment” (het smartphonearrest).225
Basically, the Supreme Court followed the Arnhem-Leeuwarden court in
breaking with the doctrinal interpretation that smartphone searches were
implicitly allowed under the traditional rules of search and seizure;226 it did not,
however, go as far as to require warrants for all smartphone searches. Based on
Art. 8 ECHR, which requires privacy interferences to be “foreseeable by law,”
the court held that the general provisions on seizure (articles 94–95 CCP) only
220. Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 22 april 2015, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2015:2954 (Neth.).
221. Rb. Noord-Holland 4 juni 2015, ECLI:NL:RBNHO:2015:4660 (Neth.) (finding a police search of a
burglary arrestee’s phone, discovering three photos in the WhatsApp image folder of weapons—not directly
connected to the burglary—unlawful).
222. Rb. Noord-Holland 26 juni 2015, ECLI:NL:RBNHO:2015:5447 (Neth.).
223. Rb. Oost-Brabant 5 juni 2015, ECLI:NL:RBOBR:2015:3228 (Neth.); Rb. Limburg 28 oktober 2015,
ECLI:NL:RBLIM:2015:9128 (Neth.).
224. HR 4 april 2017, ECLI:NL:HR:2017:584 (Neth.); HR 4 april 2017, ECLI:NL:HR:2017:588 (Neth.);
HR 4 april 2017, ECLI:NL:HR:2017:592 (Neth.). Nos 584 and 588 concerned an appeal of judgements by the
Court of Appeal Amsterdam that had upheld the traditional doctrine; No. 592 was the appeal of the ArnhemLeeuwarden Court of Appeal’s judgement that rejected the old doctrine. In the following, we refer to the latter
judgement as illustrative of all three.
225. COMMISSIE MODERNISERING OPSPORINGSONDERZOEK IN HET DIGITALE TIJDPERK [COMMITTEE ON
MODERNIZING CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS IN THE DIGITAL AGE], REGULERING VAN OPSPORINGSBEVOEGDHEDEN
IN EEN DIGITALE OMGEVING [REGULATION OF INVESTIGATIVE POWERS IN A DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT],
RIJKSOVERHEID [GOV’T OF THE NETH.] (June 2018), 6 (Neth.), https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/
rapporten/2018/06/26/rapport-commissie-koops---regulering-van-opsporingsbevoegdheden-in-een-digitaleomgeving [hereinafter COMMITTEE ON MODERNIZING].
226. HR 4 april 2017, ECLI:NL:HR:2017:592, para. 4.4–4.5 (Neth.).
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allowed smartphone searches by police officers if the search can be considered
to constitute a limited privacy intrusion:
To establish the truth, seized objects may be searched in order to obtain data
for the criminal investigation. Data stored in or available to computers are no
exception to this (…). This also applies to data stored in or available to other
seized electronic data carriers and computers, such as smartphones. The legal
basis for this investigation by investigative officers lies in the combination of
the provisions on which the power to seize is based.
For an investigative officer to investigate seized electronic data carriers and
computers in order to obtain data stored therein or available thereto, the law
does not require prior assessment by a judge or intervention by a public
prosecutor. If the privacy infringement of the investigation can be considered
limited, the general power of investigative officers, stipulated in art. 94, in
combination with art. 95 and 96 CCP, offers sufficient legitimation for this.
This can be the case if the investigation only consists in consulting a small
number of specific data stored on or available to the electronic data carrier or
computer.227

The inclusion of “or available to” suggests that smartphone searches may
also consist in investigations of remotely stored data accessible through the
phone, for example, in the cloud (provided that territory-based investigative
jurisdiction is respected, of course).
However, the Court went on to say, for more serious privacy intrusions, the
general seizure provisions are insufficient for smartphone searches without
further authorization:
If the investigation goes as far as to result in a more or less complete image
being obtained of certain aspects of the data carrier or computer user’s private
life, the investigation might be unlawful vis-à-vis him. This can especially be
the case if it concerns investigating with use of technical tools all data stored
in or available to the electronic data carrier or computer.
Given this, the view that Article 94 CCP always as such provides an adequate
legal basis for an investigation officer’s investigation of a seized smartphone,
is incorrect.228

In expressing when an investigative action may constitute a more than
limited privacy intrusion, the court used a criterion used elsewhere in statutory
law on investigation powers, namely “systematicness” (stelselmatigheid).229
This criterion entails that a more than limited privacy intrusion occurs when an
investigation power is applied in a way that is “systematic,” which is the case if
it results in “a more or less complete image being obtained of certain aspects of
someone’s [private] life.”230 The use of this criterion was surprising (because it
had been limited only to visual observation and intelligence-gathering powers),

227.
228.
229.
230.

Id. at para. 3.4.
Id. at para. 3.4–3.5.
Article 126g, para. 1, SV (Neth.); Article 126j, para. 1, SV (Neth.).
COMMITTEE ON MODERNIZING, supra note 225, at 132–33.
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but might be considered appropriate because it was one of the prevalent
conceptualizations of privacy in Dutch law. The criterion resonates with the
mosaic theory, the “more or less complete image” functioning similarly as the
“mosaic picture” in the mosaic theory.231 Thus, the judgment also resonates with
the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning in Riley.232 Similarly, the Canadian focus
on protecting a “biographical core of personal information” is also aimed at
limiting police investigations that tend to “reveal intimate details of the lifestyle
and personal choices of the individual.”233
An important difference with Riley, however, is that “systematicness”
functions to distinguish between limited and more than limited searches, and not
to identify when a warrant (or similar forms of judicial authorization under
Dutch law) is required. The Dutch Supreme Court spent far fewer words on how
privacy-invasive a smartphone search can be, and left it rather open when a
judicial authority should authorize a smartphone search incident to arrest. A
more than limited privacy intrusion requires some form of prior authorization,
but this can be an order from a prosecutor or authorization from an investigatory
judge. Both powers of public prosecutors and powers of investigatory judges are
deemed sufficient to legitimate searches that yield a more or less complete image
of certain aspects of the phone user’s private life.234 Whether a police officer
desiring to investigate the contents of a seized smartphone should seek
permission from a prosecutor or (through the prosecutor) from an investigatory
judge, was largely left to practice. The only guidance that the Supreme Court
gave was the statement that “in light of art. 8 ECHR, an investigation by the
investigative judge can especially be thought of in cases where it is foreseeable
in advance that the privacy infringement will be very serious.”235
The Court did not elucidate which types of investigations constitute “very
serious” privacy interferences. Neither, for that matter, did they articulate when
exactly a search yields a more or less complete image of aspects of the user’s
private life. The only guideline is the observation that if the court (that would
re-judge the quashed case) were to find that in the case, all data on the
smartphone and/or the SIM card had been retrieved using hardware and/or
software (and possibly manually looked at as well) so that “[complete] insight
has been obtained in contacts, call history, messages, and photos, this will give
rise to the presumption that a more than limited privacy interference has
occurred.”236 Although one could easily imagine that such comprehensive
insight should definitely be considered a “very serious” privacy interference, the
court refrained from making such a statement.

231. Cf. Bert-Jaap Koops, The Mosaic Spheres Theory of Privacy Protection (forthcoming) (discussing the
Dutch “systematicness” criterion as an (implicit) example of the mosaic theory).
232. Riley, 573 U.S. at 403.
233. R. v. Plant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281, 293 (Can.).
234. HR 4 april 2017, ECLI:NL:HR:2017:592 (Neth.).
235. Id.
236. HR 4 april 2017, ECLI:NL:HR:2017:584 (Neth.); HR 4 april 2017, ECLI:NL:HR:2017:588 (Neth.).
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Altogether, the Supreme Court left a very considerable grey area between
“consulting a small number of specific data”237 (as a limited privacy
interference) and “investigating with use of technical tools all data”238 (as a
presumably more than limited privacy interference), and between more than
limited and “very serious”239 privacy interferences.
4. Post-“Smartphone Judgment” Case Law
Several dozens of Dutch judgments have been published that refer to and
apply the “smartphone judgment.”240 The general impression arising from these
post-smartphone judgment cases is that, so far, courts tend to downplay the
privacy interest and seldom find a smartphone search conducted by police to
constitute a very serious privacy interference, as the following examples show.
In many cases, courts hold that a smartphone search only concerned a
limited privacy intrusion, particularly because, apparently or presumably, only
few files had been investigated.241 For example, searching for a contact in the
WhatsApp contact list and making a screenshot of the associated profile picture
is a limited search,242 as is searching a suspect’s phone for confirmation of
information found on a victim’s phone and finding some WhatsApp messages
and conversations between suspect and victim as well as a photograph of the
victim.243 Manually searching (scrolling) and looking at several videos was also
held a limited privacy intrusion (even though two of these had been filmed inside
a home),244 as was targeted looking at pictures in the photo gallery.245 One court
even held that a large data set did not yield a more or less complete image of
certain aspects of the suspect’s private life (and thus, was a limited privacy
intrusion), arguing that most of the contacts found concerned first names or
nicknames (further investigation into these persons largely having proved
fruitless), that the suspect’s Facebook, WhatsApp, email, text messages, Internet
history, and photos had a “very fragmented character,” and that “no

237. HR 4 april 2017, ECLI:NL:HR:2017:592 (Neth.).
238. COMMITTEE ON MODERNIZING, supra note 225, at 6.
239. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
240. COMMITTEE ON MODERNIZING, supra note 225, at 6.
241. See, e.g., HR 14 november 2017, ECLI:NL:HR:2017:2869 (Neth.) in combination with Parket HR 26
september 2017, ECLI:NL:PHR:2017:1245 (Neth.) (finding that apparently only few files had been consulted,
given that the police officer manually investigating the smartphone had only seen that the suspect had various
missed calls, messages, and WhatsApp messages (and accidentally seeing a new message coming in a day after
the arrest, which triggered a search of the suspect’s home)).
242. Hof Den Haag 11 juli 2018, ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2018:2167 (Neth.).
243. HR 26 juni 2018, ECLI:NL:HR:2018:1013 (Neth.) in combination with Parket HR 15 mei 2018,
ECLI:NL:PHR:2018:683 (Neth.).
244. HR 23 januari 2018, ECLI:NL:HR:2018:71 (Neth.) in combination with Parket HR 28 november 2017,
ECLI:NL:PHR:2017:1470 (Neth.).
245. HR 10 juli 2018, ECLI:NL:HR:2018:1121 (Neth.) and Parket HR 15 mei 2018,
ECLI:NL:PHR:2018:764 (the Advocate-General, in his advisory opinion in this case, observing that the privacy
intrusion of targeted looking at pictures may be more than minor if it concerns “very many photographs,” but
that—absent evidence that the police officer looked at very many pictures—there was no indication that the case
involved a more than limited privacy intrusion).
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communications of a personal character” were found.246 Other factors favoring
a conclusion of limited privacy interference include that the particular type of
phone has limited functionality247 or that messages have a business rather than
personal character.248
While many cases thus concern minor privacy intrusions, we found only
two cases involving a “very serious” privacy intrusion. Following the
smartphone judgment, a public prosecutor requested that an investigative judge
authorize a smartphone search in the so-called “sex bailiff” case (featuring a
bailiff who compelled debtors to pay “in kind” rather than in cash).249 The
investigative judge agreed with the prosecutor’s assessment that the
investigation of the bailiff’s smartphone could uncover “certain photos, images,
and other files” that could constitute a very serious interference with the
suspect’s privacy, and authorized the search because of the serious character of
the suspected sexual and official crimes.250 The other case also involved
investigation of a sexual offense, namely uploading to public porn sites a
covertly recorded video of (consensual) sex between the suspect and the
victim.251 Since the suspect was an attorney, the public prosecutor expected that
not only sexual images but also privileged information might be encountered in
the search, and therefore requested permission from the investigatory judge.252
The District Court of Noord-Holland stipulated that such permission should be
granted, provided that the search remain limited to several precise, offensespecific search terms (additional search terms requiring separate permission) and
that it be conducted by a technical expert who was not part of the investigation
team.253
Given the Dutch Supreme Court’s mention that a privacy intrusion can be
more than limited especially “if it concerns investigating with use of technical
tools all data,”254 courts frequently mention the use of automated search tools as
a possibly relevant factor—often to argue a contrario that a search was manual
and hence not very intrusive.255 Even if all data are automatically copied from a
smartphone, courts still consider that the privacy interference is limited, as the

246. Hof Amsterdam 13 oktober 2017, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2017:4153 (Neth.).
247. Hof Amsterdam 14 december 2018, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2018:4610 (Neth.) (holding that a so-called
“PGP phone” (a Blackberry using the Pretty Good Privacy encryption application) only served to make notes or
send messages, but did not allow calling or making photographs, so that many aspects of private life could not
be pictured by the phone).
248. Id. (observing that, as apparent from message contents, communication was read with business
relations, constituting very limited interference with private life); see also Hof Amsterdam 13 oktober 2017,
ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2017:4153 (Neth.) (emphasizing that, as far as call or message contents could be distilled,
these concerned business correspondence).
249. Rb. Limburg 8 mei 2017, ECLI:NL:RBLIM:2017:4484 (Neth.).
250. Id.
251. Rb. Noord-Holland 29 juli 2019, ECLI:NL:RBNHO:2019:6764 (Neth.).
252. Id. at 3.
253. Id. at 3–4.
254. Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 22 april 2015, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2015:2954 (Neth.).
255. HR 14 november 2017, ECLI:NL:HR:2017:2869 (Neth.) in combination with Parket HR 26 september
2017, ECLI:NL:PHR:2017:1245 (Neth.).
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following examples make clear. One court argued that making a mirror copy of
the smartphone data and then using automated tools to investigate the data does
not necessarily constitute “systematicness”:256 technical tools “can also, or
perhaps rather, enable a limited search. Specifically, one can think of a search
into a limited period or particular groups of files.”257 Another court simply, and
in our view erroneously, argued that a search using forensic software tools of all
textual data copied from an iPhone constituted only a minor privacy interference
because the police officers “only investigated those data that they considered
relevant to the investigation. It has not been substantiated that the phone was
investigated for other purposes than finding evidence of the case for which the
suspect was arrested.”258 This would suggest that any search of smartphone data
could be conducted by police officers without higher authorization, as long as
the search is targeted to the case at hand; that would effectively do away with
privacy protection in criminal procedure.
One important aspect of the Dutch post-smartphone judgment case law is
that courts only seem to consider the privacy infringement of smartphone files
that were eventually used in the case. They seldom consider how narrow or
broad a search actually was, perhaps for lack of insight into what police officers
actually did when searching the phone. This outcome-oriented rather than
process-oriented perspective features in many cases, perhaps most visibly in the
Amsterdam Court of Appeal’s judgment that the large data set that the police
had found turned out not to tell too much about the suspect’s personal life,
because of the “fragmented” and business character of the contents.259 However,
one could easily imagine that the Blackberry’s contact list could have contained
not only first names and nicknames, but many full names, that more pictures
might have been found than “a few pictures of the suspect with other women”
(that is, other than his wife), which in itself might, in certain cases, already be
considered a more than minor privacy infringement), and particularly that the
suspect’s Facebook, WhatsApp, email (with attachments), text messages,
Internet history, and photos on the suspect’s smartphone (a Samsung S4) might
have revealed more than “fragmented” information about his private life.260 It is
highly questionable to argue that some search activity constituted only a minor
privacy intrusion if the information the search yields does not show a more or
less complete image of certain aspects of someone’s private life; rather, the
intrusiveness of the search ought to be based on an ex ante assessment of what
the search is, in the circumstances, reasonably likely to yield in terms of
information about private life.
256. COMMITTEE ON MODERNIZING, supra note 225, at 81 (discussing systematicness).
257. Gemeenschappelijk Hof van Justitie van Aruba, Curaçao, Sint Maarten en van Bonaire, Sint Eustatius
en Saba 5 oktober 2017, ECLI:NL:OGHACMB:2017:197 (Neth.). Relevant in this case was the fact that the
suspect, when asked what private information the smartphone contained, could only remember a couple of
pictures, so that automatically targeted searches might perhaps still be “systematic” if the phone evidently
contains much private information. Id.
258. Hof’s-Hertogenbosch 7 juli 2017, ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2017:3151 (Neth.).
259. Hof Amsterdam 13 oktober 2017, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2017:4153 (Neth.).
260. Id.
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Another striking, related aspect in Dutch case law is the focus on the
privacy intrusion of the items that end up in the criminal file: courts do not seem
to consider whether or not police officers have looked at, and taken knowledge
of, many other smartphone items that they considered uninteresting or irrelevant
to the case. It is plausible to argue that searching in the contact list for a particular
contact, and finding a photo of the victim of a sexual offense on the suspect’s
phone, are limited privacy intrusions; but if it is unknown what the police looked
at in order to find these particular items, and what else they may have looked at,
can one plausibly argue that the search, as such, was a minor privacy intrusion?
From one administrative case, we can surmise that police investigations of
seized smartphones may well involve a far broader range of items than the
incriminating one(s) ending up in the criminal file.261 In this case, the plaintiff
requested deletion of data from police records, arguing that the investigation of
her seized smartphone had constituted a more than minor privacy interference
and was therefore unlawful, given that the criminal file in the case against her
contained one WhatsApp conversation with her son (featuring thirteen
messages), parenthetically mentioning that “the entire printout of the file [of
WhatsApp and text messages found on the seized phone] consists of 343 pages
and was not included” in the file.262 The request was denied, both for procedural
reasons and because the smartphone had been seized with authorization from the
investigative judge (which surely covered the privacy intrusion of the
investigation).263 However, the case is interesting because it shows that, even if
only one WhatsApp conversation or text message is included in the file, the
investigation may well have involved looking through all the conversations and
messages on the phone—which to us definitely seems a more than limited
privacy intrusion.
One reason for this narrow perspective on privacy intrusiveness is the fact
that courts generally argue that the privacy harm of a smartphone search consists
of a police officer having been able to take knowledge of contents, but that the
defense has not demonstrated that “taking knowledge of the suspect’s private
data by the police officers has led, other than in the framework of the
investigated criminal case, to any further dissemination of private data or any
other concrete prejudice.”264 This is not to say that there is no privacy intrusion
when police officers get to see private information, but the fact that data have
only been seen by investigating officers and have not further spread is a reason
for courts to consider the privacy violation to be excusable. This is all the more
so since almost all cases concern investigations that happened prior to the
smartphone judgment, so that police officers acted in good faith under then-

261. Raad van State 6 juni 2018, ECLI:NL:RVS:2018:1807 (Neth.).
262. Id. at 9.
263. Id.
264. Hof Den Haag 22 juni 2017, ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2017:2325 (Neth.), confirmed by HR 10 juli 2018,
ECLI:NL:HR:2018:1119 (Neth.). Similar reasoning and language is used in, for example, Hof’s-Hertogenbosch
17 oktober 2017, ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2017:4433 and Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 22 maart 2019, ECLI:NL:
GHARL:2019:2508 (Neth.).
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applicable law. Also, courts point to a (somewhat gratuitous, in our opinion)
statement by a public prosecutor that she would certainly have given
authorization for the smartphone search, had she been asked at the time.265 As a
result of these factors, even if courts consider that the authorization-lacking
smartphone search constituted a more than minor privacy intrusion,266 they do
not attach legal consequences to the privacy violation, other than noting that it
happened.267 This is in line with the general finding that Dutch criminal
procedure, with its limited sanctioning of unlawfully obtained evidence, tends
to be pragmatic, placing more importance on fighting crime than protecting
privacy.268
5. Statutory Reform: Modernizing the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure
In 2014, the Dutch government started a large-scale process to modernize
the Code of Criminal Procedure, which dates from 1926 and, partly because the
many amendments and changes since 1926 make it hard to see the forest for the
trees, there is a need to update it in integral fashion.269 Another reason for
modernization is the increasing role and special characteristics of digital
investigations, and the fact that current law is not well-aligned to the realities of
digital investigation practice. Computer searches incident to arrest are
illustrative of this, as the Minister of Justice recognizes in the so-called Contour
Memorandum:
It is hard to justify that the investigation of a computer and securing data stored
thereon during a search is covered by specific safeguards, while if that same
computer would have been seized during the search, the investigation of that
seized computer and the securing of the data stored thereon is not surrounded
by similar safeguards. Moreover, on the basis of the separate seizure powers
for investigation officers, for example with stopping and arrest, current law
does not foresee in authorization from a higher authority for investigating for
instance a seized smartphone and taking knowledge of the data stored
thereon. . . . In this light, I consider it necessary to further regulate the
investigation of seized electronic data carriers and the securing of the data
stored thereon for investigation purposes. I am thinking of the requirement

265. See, e.g., Rb. Limburg 2 juni 2017, ECLI:NL:RBLIM:2017:5133; Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 22 maart
2019, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2019:2508 (Neth.).
266. See, e.g., Hof’s-Hertogenbosch 17 oktober 2017, ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2017:4433 (Neth.) (finding that
the copying of all data from a Blackberry phone and a notebook and the analysis of the images, video files, chats,
emails, Internet history, and Skype data could yield a more or less complete image of certain aspects of the
suspect’s private life).
267. See HR 10 juli 2018, ECLI:NL:HR:2018:1121 (Neth.);
Parket HR 15 mei 2018,
ECLI:NL:PHR:2018:764 (Neth.); Hof Amsterdam 13 oktober 2017, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2017:4153 (Neth.).
268. Parket HR 26 September 2017, ECLI:NL:PHR:2017:1245 (Neth.).
269. See Toespraak van minister Opstelten 1e Congres Modernisering Wetboek van Strafvordering [Speech
by Minister Opstelten at the 1st Congress on Modernizing the Code of Criminal Procedure], RIJKSOVERHEID
[GOV’T OF THE NETH.] (June 19, 2014) (Neth.), https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/toespraken/2014/
06/19/toespraak-van-minister-opstelten-bij-het-congres-modernisering-wetboek-van-strafvordering
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that a higher authority decides on investigating the seized electronic data
carrier and the securing of the data stored thereon. . . .270

A discussion memorandum on search and seizure explained just how
intrusive computer investigations are:
Taking knowledge of and securing the email correspondence, photos and
videos, personal notes and Internet search history stored on a data carrier can,
separately or combined, seriously interfere with the subject’s privacy.
Compare the seizure of all photo albums, all video tapes, all personal letters,
all personal notes (diaries) of a person suspected of for example drug
trafficking. Such a seizure would easily be deemed disproportional.271

Here, the argumentation compares investigating a seized smartphone or
other type of computer with a very extensive use of seizure of objects normally
stored in the home, and thus implicitly compares computer searches with
dwelling searches (echoing the U.S. Supreme Court’s argumentation in Riley).
It is therefore surprising that the memorandum and the subsequent draft Bill
proposed that the Public Prosecutor would be the main authority with power to
authorize smartphone searches incident to arrest rather than the investigatory
judge—who is the regular authority to decide on dwelling searches.272 The draft
Bill triggered considerable criticism from practitioners in the consultation stage
on its regulation of digital investigation powers, including on the designation of
the Public Prosecutor as the default authority for all investigations of digital
devices (which would seem to offer too much protection for very simple devices,
such as a bike chip with only an identification number, and possibly too little for
extensive smartphone searches).273 In the meantime, the Supreme Court also
passed the “smartphone judgment,”274 suggesting that “very serious” privacy
interferences require authorization from the investigatory judge, also raising
questions on the proposed draft Bill’s provisions. As a result, the government
decided to install a committee to examine and advise them on the regulation of
digital investigation powers in the modernized Code.275

270. KAMERSTUKKEN II 2015–16, 29 279, no. 278, 63–64 (Neth.).
271. Discussiestuk: Onderzoek ter plaatse, inbeslagneming en doorzoeking en onderzoek van
gegevensdragers en in geautomatiseerde werken (Boek 2) [Discussion Paper: On-Site Investigation, Seizure,
Search and Investigation of Data Carriers and in Computers (Book 2)], 37 DOCPLAYER (June 4, 2014) (Neth.),
https://docplayer.nl/6697301-Discussiestuk-onderzoek-ter-plaatse-inbeslagneming-en-doorzoeking-enonderzoek-van-gegevensdragers-en-in-geautomatiseerde-werken-boek-2.html.
272. See id. at 52; see also Concept Wetsvoorstel tot vaststelling van Boek 2 van het nieuwe Wetboek van
Strafvordering: Het opsporingsonderzoek [Draft Bill Establishing Book 2 of the New Code of Criminal
Procedure: Criminal Investigation], RIJKSOVERHEID [GOV ’T OF THE NETH .], 13 (Feb. 2017) (Neth.),
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2017/02/07/wetsvoorstel-tot-vaststelling-van-boek-2van-het-nieuwe-wetboek-van-strafvordering [hereinafter Bill Establishing Book 2].
273. COMMITTEE ON MODERNIZING, supra note 225, at 6, 81.
274. Id. at 7.
275. Instellingsbesluit Commissie modernisering opsporingsonderzoek in het digitale tijdperk [Decree
Establishing the Committee on Modernizing Criminal Investigations in the Digital Age], OVERHEID [GOV’T]
(July 12, 2017), Stcrt. 2017 No. 39081 1 (Neth.), https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0039770/2018-01-01.
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This Committee on modernizing criminal investigation in the digital age276
recommended applying a general criterion for assessing the intrusiveness of
digital investigations, to searches of smartphones and laptops incident to arrest,
as well as to computer investigations during searches of dwellings and other
premises, and to various special investigation powers such as data production
orders and open-source intelligence.277 Their proposed general criterion
followed the existing criterion of “systematicness”278 and elaborated this into a
threefold distinction of (profound) systematicness:
• non-systematicness: a minor privacy intrusion;
• systematicness: when (reasonably foreseeably) a more or less complete
picture arises of certain aspects of someone’s private life;
• profound systematicness: when (reasonably foreseeably) a more or less
complete picture arises of a) an essential [wezenlijk] part of someone’s
private life (“deep”) or b) a substantial part of someone’s private life
(“broad”).279

The committee tied these three degrees of intrusiveness to different
authorization levels, requiring approval from the police, public prosecutor, and
investigatory judge, respectively.280 Other conditions may apply to approval as
well, such as differentiated levels of suspicion, types of offenses, and
subsidiarity requirements.281
The committee’s advice was taken up in the revised draft Bill of October
2018, which adopted the threefold criterion of (profound) systematicness in the
proposed regulation of, inter alia, computers seized incident to arrest.282
According to the draft Explanatory Memorandum, the use of this criterion
follows the committee’s advice, the Dutch Supreme Court’s smartphone
judgment, and current practice following the latter judgment.283 The explanation
of profound systematicness largely reiterated the committee’s explanation.284
The draft Explanatory Memorandum provided examples to help interpret
the abstract criterion. Non-systematic (a minor privacy intrusion), for example,
are investigations of data carriers that intrinsically contain only few data, such
as “bike chips” (only containing identification numbers for theft prevention),
and manual investigations of a limited number of files on smartphones, for
instance the most recent photos or videos on a smartphone seized from
bystanders of nightlife violence, or looking up the username in certain apps.285
Automated searches for evidence will normally constitute systematic
276. The committee is also called the Koops Committee, after its chairperson—the same as the second
author of this paper.
277. COMMITTEE ON MODERNIZING, supra note 225, at 36–41.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 37–40.
280. Id. at 41.
281. Id. at 48–50.
282. Id. at 41.
283. Bill Establishing Book 2, supra note 272, at 17.
284. Id. at 24–25.
285. COMMITTEE ON MODERNIZING, supra note 225, at 45.
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investigations, but if searches are highly targeted and offense-specific, for
instance, images resembling a suspect’s graffiti tag, in which presumably only
relevant (graffiti) pictures will show up, this is still non-systematic.286 In
contrast, investigation officers manually scrolling through the entire collection
of the past year’s pictures to look for graffiti pictures are conducting a systematic
search (a more than minor privacy intrusion), since they can broadly take note
of the suspect’s private life.287 Thus, even without copying search results,
looking at all or many photos on a smartphone will be systematic.288 More
generally, the Memorandum mentions various factors to take into account to
determine whether investigation activities are (profoundly) systematic: number
and type of data, whether data can be automatically investigated, type of data
carrier, mode of storage, and automation of the investigation.289 How these
factors can be applied will be explained in more detail for open-source
investigations in the future Explanatory Memorandum of the final Bill that is to
be submitted to parliament sometime in 2020.290

II. DISCUSSION
In Part I, we extensively described how courts (and, in the Netherlands,
legislators) assess the intrusiveness of smartphone searches incident to arrest. In
this Part, we will analyze and compare these findings, starting with explaining
the framework of our analysis.
A. THEORETICAL LENS: CONTENT AND CONTAINER APPROACHES TO
PROTECTING PRIVACY
In previous research, we analyzed how legislators and courts assess the
intrusiveness of new (manifestations of) police investigation methods by
examining which privacy frameworks they resort to in response to privacyintrusive conduct by police.291 We are interested in this question because privacy
protection in the law is often not achieved using an abstract concept of privacy,
but through more concrete proxies that capture relevant elements of privacy.
Legal frameworks protect, for instance, privacy of the home, letters, writings,
communications, bodies, thoughts, property, family, social relations, and
identity.292 These proxies help make privacy concrete, which enhances legal
certainty, both for citizens (to know how their privacy may legitimately be
infringed by the police under criminal procedure rules) and police (to know
under which conditions they may infringe privacy when conducting
investigative activities). Although such proxies are intrinsically imperfect (they
can never fully capture privacy, given privacy’s complex, multi-faceted, and
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

Id. at 45–46.
Id. at 46.
Id.
Id. at 37.
Id.
See generally Koops et al., supra note 18; Škorvánek et al., supra note 18.
Koops et al., supra note 16, at 541 fig.1.
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context-dependent character); but, generally, they work well enough to protect
privacy, striking an apposite balance between abstractness and concreteness of
the law. However, over time, proxies can become less suitable for protecting
privacy due to socio-technical change.293 In the current data-pervasive and
ubiquitously connected world, older proxies such as privacy of the home and
secrecy of communications content have become less powerful at capturing what
privacy means in today’s age.294 Our broader research over the past years has
therefore analyzed whether new privacy proxies could better capture what
privacy means in the twenty-first century.
A major insight derived from this research is that there are (at least) two
different general types of privacy protection in the law: container-based
approaches and content-based approaches.295 Container-based approaches, for
instance, protect the home, communications channels, and “boxes,
bags . . . wrapped packages, glove compartments, and locked trunks”296 as per
se protection-worthy spaces, independent from their actual contents.297 A
dwelling, for instance, is protected from a search even if nothing privacyrelevant is actually stored there; a communication channel is protected against
wiretapping even if it transmits only non-personal or non-private
communications. In contrast, content-based approaches focus on content as per
se protection-worthy, independent from the specific container that holds it. For
instance, data protection law protects personal data or personally identifiable
information as such, regardless of whether the information is stored in a private
or public space, stored in a closed container, or openly visible.
In our research, we found that “there is increasing discomfort with the
answers . . . yielded by the traditional privacy frames” to assess the intrusiveness
of location tracking by police,298 and that the
adequacy of [the classic privacy] frames in assessing the intrusiveness of
police hacking is limited . . . . Across the jurisdictions, we observe the
contours of two such new frames emerging: a container-based approach
focusing on the computer as protection-worthy in itself and a content-based
approach focusing on the data.299

We concluded that the two new frames “complement each other in their
capacity to serve as a yardstick to assess the intrusiveness of police hacking (and,

293. See Bert-Jaap Koops, On Legal Boundaries, Technologies, and Collapsing Dimensions of Privacy, 3
POLITICA E SOCIETÀ 247 (2014).
294. Id.
295. Škorvánek et al., supra note 18, at 1078–81.
296. United States v. Camou, 773 F.3d 932, 943 (9th Cir. 2014).
297. Note that, in articulating this container approach, we use “container” in a broad sense, denoting
anything that encloses a certain space, for example, envelopes, changing rooms, dwellings, and computers; many
such containers can function as “privacy spaces.” See Bert-Jaap Koops, Privacy Spaces, 121 W. VA. L. REV.
611, 614 (2018) (defining privacy space as a “space in which you can be yourselves”). This is similar to the U.S.
Supreme Court’s definition of a container, for Fourth Amendment purposes, as “any object capable of holding
another object.” New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 n.4 (1981).
298. Koops et al., supra note 18, at 696.
299. Škorvánek et al., supra note 18, at 1069–70.
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perhaps, of criminal investigation powers in digital contexts more generally)”
and hypothesized “that a combination of both is likely to be the most suitable
new framework for evaluating the intrusiveness of police hacking.”300
Now, we want to test whether, to what extent, and how a combination of
container- and content-based approaches could be a suitable framework for
assessing the intrusiveness of police investigations. The context of smartphone
searches incident to arrest is particularly suitable for this, with many and varied
cases in the three jurisdictions outlined in Part I, above. Through the lens of the
framework of container- versus content-based approaches, we analyze, first,
how container and/or content approaches feature in search-incident-to-arrest
cases in the jurisdictions we studied, and second, how preferences for container
or content approaches, or combinations thereof, play out in this context.
B. CONTAINER AND CONTENT ARGUMENTS
In all three jurisdictions, we see similar argumentation for why the searchincident-to-arrest doctrine should apply differently to smartphones (and other
types of computers) than to traditional objects. The difference between a ride on
horseback and a flight to the moon is simply too substantial. All jurisdictions
recognize that, generally, smartphones are devices that potentially contain a vast
amount of diverse and privacy-sensitive information. Combined with
smartphones’ large storage capacity as a significant factor,301 the mosaic
theory302 functions, albeit implicitly, as an important privacy framework here.
As the Riley court observed, “a cell phone collects in one place many distinct
types of information . . . that reveal much more in combination than any isolated
record. . . . The sum of an individual’s private life can be reconstructed through
a thousand photographs labeled with dates, locations, and descriptions.”303
Similarly, the dissent in Fearon argued that smartphone searches allow the
police to see through the “windows to our inner private lives.”304 The Dutch
criteria of systematicness (“a more or less complete image being obtained of
certain aspects of [the user’s] private life”)305 and of profound systematicness
(that is, when “a more or less complete picture arises of a) an essential . . . or b)
a substantial part of someone’s private life”)306 likewise use mosaic metaphors
(pictures resulting from a data set) to highlight privacy intrusiveness.
An additional factor plays a role here: the ease of obtaining mosaic pictures
because of the prevalence of modern-day smartphones. Traditional objects that
can reveal significant parts of private life, such as (printed) photographs or
diaries, may also occasionally be found on arrestees, but these are exceptional
cases; in contrast, smartphones are likely found in most cases. Thus, the default
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

Id. at 1080–81.
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393–97 (2014); R. v. Fearon, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 621, para. 51 (Can.).
See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
See Riley, 573 U.S. at 394 (emphasis added).
Fearon, 3 S.C.R. at para. 101 (emphasis added).
HR 4 april 2017, ECLI:NL:HR:2017:592, para. 3.4 (Neth.) (emphasis added).
COMMITTEE ON MODERNIZING, supra note 225, at 37–40.

274

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:229

situation flips from an incidental finding to an almost routine investigation of
private life if objects found on or near an arrestee are seized and searched.307
The ubiquity of smartphones significantly reduces the effort police have to make
to gather data and, thus, the cost of investigation. This factor, as Matthew
Tokson has recently argued, is a major factor in Fourth Amendment privacy
assessments.308
Essentially, we observe courts combining container-based and contentbased arguments: smartphones (as devices or containers) are special because
they generally contain content that, in combination, reveals a mosaic picture of
private life; and smartphone contents (information, data, or links between data)
are special because, crucially, smartphones combine different functions, are
ubiquitous, and have large storage capacity. These are mutually reinforcing
rationales: smartphones are particularly protection-worthy because of key
characteristics of their contents, and smartphone contents are particularly
protection-worthy because of key characteristics of their container.
What emerges most strikingly from our comparative overview, is that
while the underlying reasoning of smartphone searches of potentially high
intrusiveness is similar (namely that a smartphone search can easily result in an
intrusive mosaic picture of someone’s private life), the conclusions drawn from
this reasoning differ significantly. The Riley court (similarly to the Fearon
dissent) concluded that because smartphones “as a category” often contain so
much private information, they should be protected categorically from
warrantless searches.309 Thus, U.S. doctrine applies a container approach to
privacy protection, defining smartphones310 as per se protection-worthy privacy
spaces—regardless of what the specific smartphone in an individual case
actually contains. In contrast, the majority in the Fearon case and the Dutch
Supreme Court concluded that because smartphones often contain so much
private information, their contents should be protected from warrantless
searches. Rather than give categorical protection to smartphones, these courts
held that the intrusiveness of a search depends on what is actually investigated.
Thus, Canadian and Dutch doctrines apply a content approach to privacy
protection, protecting smartphones (and other computers) against intrusive
searches depending on which data are (likely to be) investigated, and thus also
depending on what the specific smartphone in a particular case actually contains.
We conclude that the United States legal framework has adopted a
container approach, while the Canadian and Dutch frameworks have adopted a
content approach. Given our finding from earlier research that both approaches
have limitations, and our hypothesis that a combination works best,311 it is

307. See supra notes 75–76, 177–178 and accompanying text.
308. Matthew Tokson, The Emerging Principles of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 88 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1,
25 (2020) (arguing that the cost of investigation, besides the intimacy of the place or thing targeted and the
amount of information sought, is a consistent principle in Fourth Amendment privacy assessments).
309. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393 (2014).
310. Defining smartphones here possibly includes similar devices. See infra Part II.C.1.
311. See supra notes 276–279 and accompanying text.
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interesting to further analyze the advantages and drawbacks of the different
frameworks adopted by the three jurisdictions, and how these jurisdictions
attempt to mitigate the drawbacks of their adopted approaches.
C. CONTAINER PROTECTION
1. Advantages and Drawbacks
Under the container approach, the smartphone is considered an object
worthy of protection in and of itself, and thus functions as a new proxy for
privacy protection. The protection resembles home protection, where the
dwelling functions as a classical proxy for privacy protection: both are spaces
enclosing a large part of private life. The Dutch discussion memorandum
compared looking through all the information on a seized smartphone to “the
seizure of all photo albums, all video tapes, all personal letters, all personal notes
(diaries) of a person,”312 similar to the First Circuit court’s argument in Wurie
that “[a]t the touch of a button a cell phone search becomes a house search.”313
SCOTUS in Riley even considered that “a cell phone search would typically
expose to the government far more than the most exhaustive search of a house,”
making smartphones an even more important privacy space than the home (at
least in terms of government interference).314 It does not really matter whether a
protection-worthy space is physical or virtual—in the words of the Canadian
Supreme Court, the “electronic world of digital communication . . . is every bit
as real as physical space” and can serve as “the place of the search.”315 This
recognition of smartphones as the new “home” locus of private life resonates
with the concept of the “digital home” that emerges in some jurisdictions as an
important new privacy framework.316
The container approach can serve as a powerful and practical analytic tool
for guiding police work on the ground. Indeed, the primary benefit of the
container approach is that it can provide clear-cut, bright-line rules governing
police investigations and the issuance of warrants. In Canada and the
Netherlands, police officers must decide whether their intended investigation of
a smartphone is sufficiently limited to not require a warrant—not an easy
decision, given that the answer depends on many factors.317 For U.S. police

312. RB Noord-Holland, 29 juli 2019, ECLI:NL:RBNHO:2019:6764 (Neth.).
313. United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 8–9 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670
F.3d 803, 806 (7th Cir. 2012)). Although the Flores-Lopez court found that evidence preservation concerns in
that case outweighed any invasion of privacy, the court upheld the warrantless search of the cell phone, because
the search at issue was minimally invasive—only directed at discovering the phone’s number. Flores-Lopez,
670 F.3d at 810.
314. Riley, 573 U.S. at 396.
315. R. v. Marakah, [2017] 2 S.C.R. 608, para. 28 (Can.).
316. See Škorvánek et al., supra note 18, at 1056–58 (discussing the emergence of “informatic home” as a
new privacy frame).
317. See infra Part II.D.2.b.

276

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:229

officers wanting to investigate a seized smartphone incident to arrest, the answer
is very simple: “get a warrant.”318
A corollary of this is that the Canadian and Dutch jurisdictions grant some
discretionary power of the police to conduct (simple or minimal) smartphone
searches, which may be stretched, abused, or hidden from oversight, and which,
therefore, require some measure to keep this discretionary power in check.319
The United States has no need for such measures, since even simple or minimal
smartphone searches are not allowed.
The simplicity of the container approach is, however, not only an
advantage but also a drawback. It is a crude, black-and-white approach that treats
all devices alike: smartphone searches categorically require a warrant, regardless
of specifics.320 This has three major consequences. First, in this approach, the
only limitation of police smartphone searches lies in the access point: to get in,
police need a warrant. But once a warrant is granted and police can enter, the
container protection is lost, no longer offering any guidance as to what can be
investigated within the container (unless the warrant itself includes restrictions
established by the issuing judge). This contrasts with the content-based
protection’s more nuanced approach, which focuses directly on regulating the
search of the phone’s contents.321
A second consequence is that much hinges on the qualification of a certain
device as pertaining to the category that has container protection. When exactly
is a computing device functionally equivalent to “[m]odern cell
phones . . . [w]ith all they contain and all they may reveal”322 that merit Riley’s
container protection? This question should be answered for many types of
devices that resemble, in some sense but not in all senses, modern cellphones,
including laptops, tablets, smart watches, USB drives, digital cameras, and incar computers. So far, the question seems to have been addressed (not
necessarily authoritatively) to a limited range of information carriers, such as
laptops323 and digital cameras.324 However, practitioners and courts may have to
grapple for a considerable period with classifying other devices under
SCOTUS’s reasoning and holding in Riley. Additionally, there exists some
ambiguity in whether, or how, the law should apply differently to searches of
“subcontainers” (for example, separate files, folders, apps, or directories that
exist inside a broader digital “container” such as a cellphone).325 Moreover, this
question will need to be continuously answered for future devices that currently
are not sufficiently cellphone-like to be covered by Riley but that may become

318. Riley, 573 U.S. at 403.
319. See infra Part II.D.2.
320. Cf. Škorvánek et al., supra note 18, at 1079 (articulating the crudeness of the container approach).
321. See infra Part II.D.1.
322. Riley, 573 U.S. at 403.
323. United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 487–91 (6th Cir. 2015).
324. United States v. Whiteside, No. 13 CR 576 PAC, WL 3953477, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2015).
325. See Michael Mestitz, Note, Unpacking Digital Containers: Extending Riley’s Reasoning to Digital
Files and Subfolders, 69 STAN. L. REV. 321, 323 (2017).
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equivalent when new functions are added. In that sense, the container approach
is technology-specific and may not be very sustainable over time.
A third consequence of the black-and-white container approach is that even
simple or minimal investigations require a warrant. For instance, accessing the
call log on a phone to acquire the number of incoming calls that were visible on
the screen as “my house”326 is no longer possible without a warrant under Riley,
although such activity is very far removed from assembling a mosaic-like picture
or a typical (let alone an exhaustive) house search. Allowing, as Canada and the
Netherlands do, such simple, targeted search activities by police officers without
higher authorization seems reasonable. In adopting categorical container
protection for smartphones, SCOTUS has rightly differentiated smartphone
searches from investigations of traditional objects such as bags or cigarette
packages (which are comparatively “rides on horseback”327); but it has also
effectively treated all smartphone searches as comparable to flights to the moon.
Yet there are many ways of getting from A to B, and depending on your goal,
you might choose between many different modes of travel: walking, cycling,
driving a car, taking a high-speed train or transatlantic flight, or engaging in
space travel. Smartphone searches can have different goals, and do not always—
indeed, often do not—take the form of the high end of the spectrum; several
types of simple searches the police might want to conduct quickly following
arrest are more comparable to rides on horseback than to spaceflight. In this
sense, the sole reliance on the container approach to protecting privacy in the
search-incident-to-arrest context will likely overprotect privacy at the expense
of police investigations.
2. Mitigating the Drawbacks
The first drawback of the black-and-white container approach—only
regulating access to the device but not the scope of the search of the device’s
contents—is relatively easily mitigated by the Fourth Amendment’s
particularity requirement.328 Warrants must circumscribe what may and may not
be investigated in the seized phone.329 Thus, the intrusiveness of smartphone
searches is primarily regulated by another normative framework in U.S. legal
doctrine—regulating the issuance of, and compliance with, warrants—than by
the container protection of smartphones. This is not in itself an issue, but it does
limit the thrust of using smartphones as a new proxy for privacy protection in
terms of finding new frameworks for making privacy assessments; the container
326. See United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2013).
327. Riley, 573 U.S. at 393.
328. See, e.g., Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927) (“The requirement that warrants shall
particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches under them impossible and prevents the
seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion
of the officer executing the warrant.”).
329. See, e.g., United States v. Russian, 848 F.3d 1239, 1244–46 (10th Cir. 2017) (finding that “a
‘recognizable line’ [exists for] considering how much particularity is required for computer searches” and
holding that a warrant to search a cell phone was invalid since it failed to “specify what material (e.g., text
messages, photos, or call logs) law enforcement was authorized to seize”).
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approach, in this sense, may not easily be usable in other legal systems that lack
something like the United States’ strict particularity requirement for limiting
searches.
In a similar vein, the second drawback—having to determine whether each
different type of device belongs to the class of protected containers—seems a
feature of the U.S. common law system itself, in which the facts of each case
have to be analyzed on the basis of their resemblance to precedent. Courts are
used to dealing with questions concerning the similarities and differences
between a present case and existing doctrine; it is perhaps less a drawback than
a systemic feature that courts must determine whether each digital device falls
within Riley’s conception of modern cellphones. This does not, however,
diminish the legal uncertainty that practitioners may experience when police
want to investigate a digital device that is not a cellphone but that also stores
potentially much and/or varied information. Legal certainty can only be acquired
over time, when cases involving different devices reach higher courts and
receive authoritative judgments.
The third drawback—the overprotective prohibition of any warrantless
smartphone search, however minimal—is more challenging to mitigate. The
main workaround we have observed in post-Riley cases is the application of the
plain-view doctrine, exempting searches of the smartphone’s screen from
Riley’s warrant requirement, because there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy in something in plain view.330 This fits well in the container approach,
since container protection typically protects the inside of containers, not what is
visible on their outside. It is plausible to consider what is visible on the screen
(without manipulating the device, because hitting any key or touchscreen might
show something of the device’s contents that was not visible before) as falling
under the plain-view exception. However, there is arguably a relevant difference
between smartphone screens and the outsides of traditional containers. While
the latter are usually static, the former can be dynamic: if a smartphone is seized,
the screen may still show (notifications of) incoming messages, without any
intervention by police or the smartphone user. Although such (notifications of)
incoming messages are plainly visible for the police, they were not visible at the
time of seizure. Whether this difference matters (or should matter), in practice,
for the plain-view doctrine remains an open question—although, given the
general analysis offered by the Supreme Court in Riley, there may be room for
adapting the plain-view doctrine in this context as well.
A second mitigation strategy is that certain contexts are exempted from
Riley’s standards, because the context implies a lower reasonable expectation of
privacy, for example, if the smartphone belongs to a parolee.331 These exceptions
limit the container approach’s overprotection of privacy somewhat, but of course
do not cover the bulk of typical search-incident-to-arrest cases.

330. See supra notes 96–99, 105–109 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 87–93 and accompanying text.
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Other than plain-view situations of what is visible on smartphone screens
and some context-specific special situations, we have not found major strategies
to mitigate the overprotective reach of Riley’s categorical protection of
smartphones by lower U.S. courts. We think that two additional mitigation
strategies may be envisioned. First, law enforcement could argue that certain
cursory investigations, such as those allowed under Canadian and Dutch
doctrines without a warrant, do not constitute a Fourth Amendment “search” or,
even if they do, that they are objectively reasonable in situations where the
suspect or arrestee does not maintain any reasonable expectation of privacy.332
Second, law enforcement could argue that the device at issue is not, in effect, a
Riley type of protected device. Although Riley covers not only smartphones but
also simpler types of cellphones (such as a “flip phone” exhibiting “a smaller
range of features than a smart phone”),333 its reasoning rests on the particular
affordances of smartphones, including their large storage capacity and their
multifunctionality and prevalence (allowing multiple data types to be recorded
in widely varying contexts). In concrete cases involving a cellphone with only a
few functions, so that the cellphone in question is incapable of actually revealing
a mosaic-like picture of (part of) someone’s private life, let alone of the
“privacies of life,” it might, perhaps, be plausibly argued that this device falls
outside the Riley category of protected devices.
Whether such strategies could work sufficiently to mitigate the drawbacks
of the bright-line, black-and-white approach of container protection is
something we cannot presume to answer here. Case law is still developing
dynamically post-Riley; time will tell how practice and jurisprudence manage to
address the challenges we discussed here.
D. CONTENT PROTECTION
1. Advantages and Drawbacks
Under the content approach, the contents of smartphones are considered
protection-worthy, rather than the device itself. This is because “searches of
‘smart phones’ . . . may constitute very significant intrusions of privacy, [but]
not every search is inevitably a significant intrusion.”334 Instead of regulating
access to the device as the key activity, content-based protection “impose[s]
meaningful limits on the purposes, threshold and manner of such searches.”335
Thus, content protection focuses, in particular, on the totality of data that are
332. This might look something like an extension of the analyses offered by U.S. judges in United States v.
Brixen, 908 F.3d 276, 281 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[The officer’s] actions simply do not amount to a search of Brixen’s
cell phone. He did not open or otherwise manipulate Brixen’s phone. Nor did he gain access to any of the phone’s
content or attempt to retrieve any information from within the phone.”) and United States v. Lawing, 703 F.3d
229, 238 (4th Cir. 2012) (“The police did not attempt to retrieve any information from within the phone.”),
although both of these cases rested somewhat on the plain-view doctrine in coming to their respective
conclusions.
333. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 380 (2014).
334. R. v. Fearon, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 621, para. 54 (Can.).
335. Id. at para. 63 (emphasis added).
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investigated and that may, in their combination, create a revealing picture of
(parts of) someone’s private life. The protection resembles, or may even be seen
as being based on, the framework of the mosaic theory, which is emerging in
several jurisdictions around the world as an important new privacy
framework.336
The benefits and drawbacks of the content approach largely mirror the
drawbacks and benefits of the container approach outlined in the previous Part,
so we shall not elaborate on those here. Briefly put, the main benefit of the
content approach is its flexibility (as opposed to the crudeness of the black-andwhite container approach), allowing, for instance, warrantless cursory searches
and focusing on data actually (envisioned to be) investigated rather than on the
question of whether the device belongs to the category of protected devices.
Its main drawback is the complexity that comes along with its flexibility
(as opposed to the simple, bright-line character of the container approach). The
content protection depends on the estimated level of intrusiveness of a search:
limited, shallow intrusions trigger limited protection; broader or deeper
intrusions trigger stronger protection. Whether an intrusion is (likely to be)
limited (shallow) or broad (deep) depends on many factors, related to both the
search activity and the device in question. Since investigating officers only have
to apply for higher authorization if the privacy intrusion is more than limited,
the officers face the challenge of assessing, on the ground and in the moment,
whether their envisioned investigation remains below or goes beyond the
threshold of intrusiveness—a threshold that is not particularly well-defined. Not
only does this bring along legal uncertainty, the discretionary power for making
the initial assessment also raises questions of control and oversight of police
investigations. How do Canada and the Netherlands deal with these challenges
to the content approach?
2. Mitigating the Drawbacks
To off-set the problem of overly complex intrusiveness assessments, both
jurisdictions offer sets of criteria or factors that should be taken into account
when determining whether an envisioned investigation meets the threshold of
intrusiveness: Canada has the Fearon criteria,337 the Netherlands has the
threefold criterion of (profound) systematicness and an associated list of factors
influencing the level of intrusiveness.338 We can distinguish two mitigation
strategies here, aiming to make the complex intrusiveness assessment simpler
and more manageable for practitioners, and one strategy to ensure oversight of
warrantless searches.

336. See supra Part II.B; see also Škorvánek et al., supra note 18, at 1073–78 (discussing the “informatic
privacy” and the mosaic theory as an emerging new privacy frame); Koops et al., supra note 18, at 693–95
(showing the emergence of the mosaic theory in the U.S. and in other jurisdictions as a new privacy frame).
337. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 276–281, 289 and accompanying text.
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a. Guiding Examples of Levels of Intrusiveness
First, both jurisdictions have developed relatively abstract criteria,339 which
are sufficiently general to allow covering many situations and to be sustainable
over time. Abstract criteria or general principles do not offer much concrete
guidance, but that is offset by courts applying the criteria or principles to
concrete cases over time, building up a collection of illustrative, and therewith
perhaps authoritative, examples of investigations that do or do not cross the
relevant threshold. The case law following the supreme court cases in both
jurisdictions already gives interesting indications, generating the following
picture of different levels of intrusiveness distinguished by courts. Note that this
list is indicative; it can serve as a first inventory of examples but, given that they
often derive from lower-court case law, they cannot (yet) be considered
authoritative.
Level 1: low intrusiveness (implying police can conduct such searches
without higher authorization).
• Activating a phone’s screen to see if it is locked or to prevent the
phone from reverting to a locked state.340
• Observing (copying) what is in plain view, for example, a
conversation on the screen of a seized phone, or notifications
appearing there.341
• A targeted, offense-related search for a relatively small number of
specific data,342 for example, missed calls or messages,343 a
contact in the WhatsApp contact list and the associated profile
picture,344 some videos,345 pictures in the photo gallery (if there is
no indication that the photo gallery has very many pictures that
might be seen in passing),346 the most recently made photos or
videos347 or recent text messages,348 looking up the user name in
certain apps,349 or checking for camera capacity and Internet
access.350 Note that several U.S. cases involve activities of this
kind, such as retrieving the phone number of an incoming message
from the call log, viewing call logs or text messages, or verifying
a phone’s number; while considered intrusive in the United States

339. See supra Parts I.B.3, I.C.3.
340. R. v. Roberto, 2018 ONSC 847, para. 13 (Can.).
341. R. v. Khosravi, 2018 BCSC 1791, para. 47 (Can.); United States v. Brixen, 908 F.3d 276, 282 (7th Cir.
2018). But see R. v. Kossick, 2017 SKPC 67, para. 86 (Can.).
342. HR 4 april 2017, ECLI:NL:HR:2017:592, para. 3.4 (Neth.).
343. Parket HR 26 september 2017, ECLI:NL:PHR:2017:1245, para. 3.12 (Neth.).
344. Hof Den Haag 11 juli 2018, ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2019:2524 (Neth.).
345. Parket HR 28 november 2017, ECLI:NL:PHR:2017:1470, para. 25–26 (Neth.).
346. Parket HR 15 mei 2018, ECLI:NL:PHR:2018:764, para. 10 (Neth.).
347. Bill Establishing Book 2, supra note 272, at 21–22.
348. R. v. Jones, 2015 SKPC 29, para. 62 (Can.).
349. Bill Establishing Book 2, supra note 272, at 21–22.
350. R. v. Bourdon, 2016 ONSC 2113, para. 383 (Can.).
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in meeting the Riley standard, these would not likely be considered
(very) intrusive in Canada and the Netherlands.351
• Investigating a data carrier that intrinsically contains only few data,
such as chips with an identification number.352
Levels 2 and 3: intermediate and high intrusiveness (implying police
need a warrant (Canada) or permission from the prosecutor or investigative
judge (Netherlands) for such searches).353
• Manipulating the phone to search through its contents.354 (Whether
the search meets the threshold of level 2 may, however, depend on
the extent and how targeted the search is; minimal manipulation
for targeted cursory searches might fall under level 1.)
• Downloading the entire contents of a cell phone or smartphone.355
• A more exhaustive forensic analysis (such as downloading and
analyzing all content)356—in other words, investigating with use
of technical tools all data stored in or available to the device,357
such as acquiring (complete) insight in contacts, call history,
messages, and photos,358 or analyzing the images, video files,
chats, emails, internet history, and Skype data.359
• Searching for evidence of a sexual offense, in which “certain photos,
images, and other files” of an intimate character (potentially also
including victims) could well be revealed; this can be considered
highly intrusive (level 3).360
b. Factors Influencing Intrusiveness
Because guiding examples are case-specific, usually a combination of
different facts of the case plays a role in assessing a search as exhibiting low,
intermediate, or high intrusiveness. Examples cannot easily be transposed to
new cases, which often involve slightly different circumstances. A
complementary important mitigation strategy is, therefore, to offer a set of
factors that practitioners and courts can or should consider in assessing the
351. See supra Part I.A.2 (discussing United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013)); see supra note 92
and accompanying text.
352. Bill Establishing Book 2, supra note 272, at 21–22.
353. Canadian case law only distinguishes two levels (searches that do not or do require a warrant). Dutch
case law, although applying three levels of authorization (see supra Parts I.C.3–5), so far provides little guidance
to distinguish between intermediate and serious intrusions (see supra Parts I.C.3–4). Therefore, we cannot yet
sufficiently distinguish between examples for levels 2 and 3.
354. R. v. Khosravi, 2018 BCSC 1791, para. 47 (Can.); R. v. Roberto, 2018 ONSC 847, para. 13 (Can.).
The search of Riley’s phone to access videos, photographs, and other files would also be an example of this. See
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 373 (2014).
355. R. v. Mann, 2014 BCCA 231, para. 118 (Can.); see also R v. Fearon, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 621, para. 32
(Can.).
356. R. v. Jones, 2015 SKPC 29, paras. 62–66 (Can.).
357. HR 4 april 2017, ECLI:NL:HR:2017:592, para. 3.4 (Neth.).
358. HR 4 april 2017, ECLI:NL:HR:2017:584, para. 2.7.2 (Neth.).
359. Hof’s-Hertogenbosch 17 oktober 2017, ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2017:4433 (Neth.).
360. Rb. Limburg 8 mei 2017, ECLI:NL:RBLIM:2017:4484 (Neth.).
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intrusiveness of smartphone searches. Combining indicators that Canadian and
Dutch courts—and the Dutch legislators—have developed, we can identify
various relevant factors. We have clustered them in three groups of major
factors, each encompassing various indicators or sub-factors.
1. Scope and precision (how focused and targeted is the search
itself?).
a. Relationship to the offense for which the suspect was
arrested.
b. Specificity of the search action.
c. Use of automated tools.
2. Nature and amount of information to be examined (accessed).
a. Nature of the offense.
b. Nature of the storage device.
3. Mode of storage of the data.
a. Location of the data (local versus cloud; within a shared
or private folder or app).
b. Suitability of the data for automated searches.
c. Presence of security measures.
The first factor, the scope and precision of the search, is perhaps the most
important one. It encompasses two of the four Fearon criteria: the search is truly
incidental to the arrest, and the nature and the extent of the search are tailored to
the purpose of the search.361 Thus, the search itself must bear a close relationship
to the offense for which the suspect was arrested and should be precisely targeted
to obtain only relevant information or files. The more narrowly the search is
focused on finding evidence of the specific offense for which the suspect was
arrested, the less intrusive it is likely to be. Typically, this will involve quick
manual searches for a specific information object. Automated searches are a
double-edged sword: they can be more intrusive, because more data will be
investigated, and possibly come into view, than an officer could manually look
at;362 but they can also be less intrusive, because they can help locate the sought
information without the officer observing any non-relevant information in
passing. If used properly, automated tools can assist in making a search more
targeted, and hence less intrusive.363
Scope and precision imply that the investigating officers should know
(more or less) exactly what they are looking for, so that they can use offenserelated search terms that are as specific as possible, or look only in an app or
directory that contains the type of information sought. This also implies, as the
Fearon court has said, that in warrantless arrest-related searches, as a rule, “only
recently sent or drafted emails, texts, photos and the call log may be examined
361. R v. Fearon, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 621, 661 (Can.); see also Bill Establishing Book 2, supra note 272, at 22,
24 (Dutch Draft bill) (automated searching for images resembling a suspect’s graffiti tag is highly targeted and
therefore low-intrusive; manually scrolling through a smartphone’s pictures of the past year to look for graffiti
pictures is less targeted and therefore more intrusive).
362. HR 4 april 2017, ECLI:NL:HR:2017:592, para. 3.4–3.5 (Neth.).
363. See supra notes 255–256 and accompanying text.
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as in most cases only those sorts of items will have the necessary link to the
purposes for which prompt examination of the device is permitted.”364 If officers
know what they are looking for, but have little clue where the information may
be stored or cannot find it easily with highly specific search terms, then the
search is likely to become less targeted, which is an important indicator that they
should seek authorization from higher up before proceeding.
From the perspective of our interest in new privacy frames emerging in the
regulation of digital investigations, it is relevant to note that scope and
precision—as a requirement for a search to be offense-related and as specific as
possible—is a manifestation of contextual integrity. Contextual integrity is
respect for informational norms,365 that is, norms “that govern activities and
practices within and across contexts” and are “specifically concerned with the
flow of personal information . . . from one party to another, or others.”366 As
long as police carefully target their search for crime-related information, in the
context of a search incident to arrest, they are less likely to violate contextual
integrity than if they search more broadly: the flow of crime-related information
to police can be expected, even if often unintended and undesired, by an arrestee,
while police officers looking at non-crime-related information should not be
expected. The framework of contextual integrity can thus support the approach
of content protection in privacy assessments.
Equally important is the second factor, the nature and amount of
information to be examined. The amount of information accessed obviously
matters—looking at one photograph is less intrusive than leafing through an
entire photo gallery, for example. More importantly, combinations of data or
information can create a larger, more complete picture—a mosaic—than loose
data can.367 The nature of the data may be even more significant. Consulting
photos may be more privacy-intrusive than consulting text files, since
investigating officers can often leave aside text files as irrelevant without
(entirely) taking note of their contents, but they will have seen the photos they
discard as non-relevant. The subject matter also matters: some content (for
example, nudity) is more privacy-sensitive than other content (for example,
shopping lists);368 and some content, such as business-related information, is
considered less privacy-relevant.369 The sensitivity of certain types of
information is, however, context-dependent: pictures revealing homosexual
orientation will, for instance, be highly sensitive for a closeted religious boy, but

364. Fearon, 3 S.C.R. at para. 76. Cf. Bill Establishing Book 2, supra note 272, at 21–22 (looking at the
most recent photos or videos made on a smartphone seized from a bystander of nightlife violence is minimally
intrusive).
365. HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL
LIFE 140 (2010) (“[C]ontextual integrity is defined in terms of informational norms: it is preserved when
informational norms are respected and violated when information norms are breached.”).
366. Id.
367. See supra Part II.B.
368. Cf. Koops et al., supra note 19, at 1222–24 (discussing subject matter as an important factor in privacy
intrusiveness).
369. Hof’s-Amsterdam 14 december 2018, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2018:4610 (Neth.).
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far less so for an openly gay teacher. And information generally considered nonsensitive, such as one’s music preferences, may in some cases be highly
sensitive.370 Thus, data classified as “sensitive” under data protection law
(relating, inter alia, to health, race, sexual life, and religion) are an important
indicator of privacy-intrusiveness, but not a decisive factor.371
A considerable challenge in applying this factor is that often, police will
not know very clearly how much and which information they are going to
investigate and retrieve; that will depend on many factors, including how the
sought information (if present) is stored relative to other data. Some factors can,
however, help in estimating the likelihood of the nature and amount of
information being found during a search. One is the nature of the offense: the
likelihood of finding pictures showing nudity is larger if someone is arrested for
sextortion than for embezzlement.372 Another is the nature of the storage device.
While this is the overarching criterion in the container approach (the nature of
smartphones making them protection-worthy as such), it is a supportive criterion
in the content approach: the storage capacity and, particularly, the mono-, multi,
or hyper-functionality of the device give some indication of what (type of)
information can be expected to be stored on (or accessible through) the device.
The larger the storage space and the more functions enabled on the phone, the
more likely many, diverse, or sensitive data can be found there and, hence, the
more intrusive the search will potentially be, especially if it is not targeted and
limited in scope, and vice versa.373
The third factor is also relevant, but somewhat equivocal and perhaps less
weighty than the first two. The mode of storage is mentioned by the Dutch
legislators as a relevant factor,374 although with little explanation. We think this
factor is a useful umbrella factor for several aspects of the way the data are
stored. An interesting aspect is the location of the data. The location may be an
indicator of the nature of the data (one expects the Photo Gallery to contain
photos, and the internet history to contain information about visited websites).
But in relation to the storage mode, location is particularly relevant in terms of
whether data are stored on-device or externally, in the cloud. A smartphone
search incident to arrest may involve not only data physically stored on the
phone, but also data accessible to the phone; although not very explicitly, the
Fearon decision seems to also encompass data accessible to the phone rather

370. See COMMITTEE ON MODERNIZING, supra note 225, at 44 (giving the example of a boy in a street gang
who carefully keeps his preference for romantic music secret).
371. Id.; see also Bill Establishing Book 2, supra note 272, at 24 (holding that “sensitive data” are an
important indicator for assuming a search to be profoundly systematic, but that “not every investigation of such
data is immediately profoundly systematic. After all, sensitive personal data often do not yield a profound image
of someone’s private life”).
372. Cf. HR 4 april 2017, ECLI:NL:HR:2017:592, para. 2.3 (Neth.).
373. See supra notes 273 (bike chip), 247 (PGP phone with disabled functions) and accompanying text. An
airbag control module likely also qualifies as a device associated with low intrusiveness, given its
monofunctionality. Cf. Mobley v. State, 816 S.E.2d 769, 792 (Ga. App. 2018).
374. See Bill Establishing Book 2, supra note 272, at 23.
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than just data physically stored on it.375 This was also an important argument in
Riley: since the police can search cloud-stored data from the seized phone, they
reach far beyond “the physical proximity of an arrestee.”376 The Dutch
smartphone judgment also suggests that smartphone searches might encompass
cloud-stored data.377 Investigating such externally stored data is technically
possible and possibly relevant, but makes the smartphone search rather different
in character from traditional searches incident to arrest, which only involve
objects in close vicinity to the arrestee. This, we think, is therefore an indicator
of heightened intrusiveness.
Another aspect of storage mode is the suitability of the data for automated
searches, which the Dutch legislators list as a relevant factor.378 Smartphones by
definition contain digital or digitized data, which makes them generally suitable
for automatic searches; however, text can also be stored in non-searchable
formats, such as non-searchable PDF documents or photos of texts. The presence
of such non-searchable data formats lowers the intrusiveness of a search, since
they require more effort to make them readable. The same applies to encrypted
files, which are, of course, also non-searchable. This connects to a third aspect
of storage mode: the presence of security measures. The lower and appeals
courts in Fearon had considered the absence of security measures—"[t]he cell
phone . . . was not ‘locked’ and had no password protection or other security
walls”—a relevant factor, indicating a lower (or at least not a higher) reasonable
expectation of privacy.379 In contrast, the SCC considered this immaterial:
someone’s “decision not to password protect his or her cell phone does not
indicate any sort of abandonment of the significant privacy interests one
generally will have in the contents of the phone.”380
c. Logging and Other Procedural Mechanisms
The notetaking (or logging) requirement announced by the Canadian
Supreme Court in Fearon, requiring investigating officers to take detailed notes
about how and what they examine during a search of a device381 constitutes a
significant procedural control mechanism. This requirement, and others like it,
could provide a strong safeguard against overly broad, dragnet searches of
arrestees’ digital devices. This requirement is conspicuously absent in the Dutch
system (and is somewhat irrelevant to the U.S. context, where these searches are
banned outright), causing some of the problems we noted in Part I.C.4, above.
We suggest that something like this logging requirement could serve as a crucial
375. See supra notes 171 and accompanying text (discussing how the SCC observes that a smartphone
search “may provide access to information that is in no meaningful sense ‘at’ the location of the search”).
376. See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text.
377. HR 4 april 2017, ECLI:NL:HR:2017:592, para. 3.3 (Neth.). The Dutch draft Bill also allows
investigating (lawful) network connections from the seized phone. See Bill Establishing Book 2, supra note 272,
at 26–27.
378. See Bill Establishing Book 2, supra note 272, at 23.
379. R. v. Fearon, 2010 ONCJ 645, paras. 19–22 (Can.); R. v. Fearon, 2013 ONCA 106, para. 57 (Can.).
380. R v. Fearon, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 621, para. 53 (Can.).
381. Id. at para. 82.
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regulatory mechanism for controlling and limiting the scope of police
smartphone searches in jurisdictions favoring content-based approaches.
Other rules that would control what types of data the police can search, or
the range of law enforcement agents who might have access to the data, prior to
additional authorization, could also serve a similar limiting purpose. For
example, in the rules that regulate police hacking powers (that is, the ability to
access digital systems remotely and covertly), each of these three countries
discussed in this paper have, to a varying extent, limited police powers to search
devices (remotely) based on the functionality of the search (for example, based
on the officers’ goals, the type of data likely to be discovered, and the nature of
a particular investigatory method).382 This is related to the Canadian requirement
that the nature and extent of smartphone searches must be tailored to the purpose
of the search, although the Canadian requirement is more vague and contextdependent than, for example, the Dutch rules that segment hacking powers by
specific functionalities, which distinguish, for example, between looking for
identifying information, communications, and searching through all data.383
Moreover, in the Dutch hacking legislation, the legislators have
promulgated rules that separate the technical from the tactical officers involved
in the investigation as a privacy-protective measure.384 In one smartphone
investigation case, this was also stipulated as a condition for the search.385 The
reasoning behind this is that limiting the circle of people who look at smartphone
data can be privacy-enhancing, especially in the context of “thorough ‘datadump’ searches”386 that involve copying all data on the device and then
analyzing them with technical tools. Because officers investigating a case have
an interest in finding evidence, there is some risk they overstep the boundary of
what they can look at. Thus, function separation is a good way to prevent dragnet
searches and decrease the privacy-related harm when non-relevant data may be
seen, because technical officers (rather than the primary investigating officers)
who analyze the data would normally not know the suspects or engage with
them.
The Dutch view might seem a narrow perspective on privacy intrusiveness.
However, Dutch courts generally argue that the privacy harm that accrues during
a smartphone search is based on the consequences of a police officer’s taking
knowledge of personal information about the individual: as long as an officer’s
“taking knowledge of the suspect’s private data” has not led “to any further
dissemination of private data or any other concrete prejudice” beyond the
confines of the relevant investigation, Dutch courts have found the privacy
violation to be only minimally invasive.387 Possibly, the line of reasoning in
Dutch case law may be shifting in the future: recently, Advocate-General
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.

See Škorvánek et al., supra note 18, at 1012–26, 1079.
Id. at 1034.
Id. at 1019.
RB Noord-Holland, 29 juli 2019, ECLI:NL:RBNHO:2019:6764 (Neth.).
Fearon, 3 S.C.R. at para. 2.
Hof’s-Den Haag 22 juni 2017, ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2017:2325 (Neth.).
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Spronken has advised the Supreme Court to rule that courts should investigate
by themselves the actual harm that a smartphone search caused to a suspect,
because the burden of proving the exact harm cannot be put on the defense.388 If
the Dutch Supreme Court follows this advice, law enforcement officers might
be stimulated to document their search activities better in order to convince
courts that they did not overstep thresholds of intrusiveness.
Another interesting strategy in this context might be Orin Kerr’s proposal
(within the Fourth Amendment context) to narrow, or even abolish, the plain
view doctrine for computer searches, for example, to disallow use of information
about another crime that came “into plain view” when searching for information
related to the case at hand.389 This might, according to Kerr, be a plausible way
to prevent dragnet investigations in the future.390

CONCLUSION
Tensions between law enforcement interests in conducting criminal
investigations and individual privacy are brought to the fore by the regulatory
choice to either institute a blanket ban on investigatory conduct (like that
imposed by Riley) or a more nuanced, case-by-case, and context-dependent
inquiry (like those promulgated in Canada and the Netherlands). Both
approaches, and recent supreme court attention in all three countries, were
motivated by similar concerns about the informational privacy risks attendant in
allowing warrantless searches of digital communication devices with massive
storage capacity. However, the outcomes reached in each country differ in
important ways, especially in terms of how law enforcement officers must
modify their daily practice to comply. In comparison to the container-based
approach in the United States (restricting almost all searches of cellphones
without a warrant), we find that the content-based approaches in Dutch and
Canadian law are more granular and would allow more focused, fine-tuned
searches for crime-related evidence as long as the search is not too
comprehensive, open-ended, or fully automated.
Both approaches have drawbacks. On one hand, the container approach is
limited, despite its practical benefits in terms of drawing bright lines that officers
on the ground can follow more easily. It works only in combination with many
other doctrines in criminal law (some of which, like the particularity and warrant
requirements in U.S. law, cannot be easily exported to other jurisdictions).
Because not all searches of smartphones are flights to the moon, sole reliance on
the container approach to protecting privacy in the search-incident-to-arrest
context is likely to overprotect privacy at the expense of police investigations.
Indeed, the container approach is inherently limited because its blanketing ban
on smartphone searches incident to arrest does not always correspond to the
388. Parket HR 5 november 2019, ECLI:NL:PHR:2019:1121, para. 4.11 (Neth).
389. Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 566 (2005)
(“Narrowing or even eliminating the plain view exception may eventually be needed to ensure that warrants to
search computers do not become the functional equivalent of general warrants.”).
390. Id. at 567–68.
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specific concerns that motivated the U.S. Supreme Court to adopt it (that is, the
outcome of the ruling does not reflect all the nuance visible in the Court’s
reasoning to come to its conclusion).
On the other hand, the content approach is also limited. Focusing only on
content, and determining the legality of each smartphone search by the level of
intrusiveness (or “(profound) systematicness”) evident in each case, erases many
of the bright lines visible to police officers on the ground, making it much more
difficult for them to know, in advance, what they are allowed to do. The
unpredictability of the legality of their searches may be reflected in the lack of
information provided to judges in Dutch cases on how searches were conducted.
As a result, these cases tend to focus on the investigation’s outcomes (for
example, one incriminating photograph found) rather than its process (for
example, looking through all photographs). This concern might be ameliorated
by something like the note-taking requirement established by Fearon. More
generally, the content approach is more likely to work if the three mitigation
strategies described above391 are followed in order to make the approach easier
to operationalize in practice. Thus, while the content approach does have limits,
these limitations could substantially be addressed in practice by applying
mitigation strategies that not only limit broad dragnet searches but also provide
some practical guidance to police officers on the ground.
In the end, we conclude that combining both approaches may achieve the
best results. We suggest that blending elements from the content- and containerbased approaches might provide a fruitful alternative path forward, as they could
function as complementary normative frameworks.392 Indeed, a combination of
emerging and preexisting container-based and content-based approaches to
regulating police searches might be used to solve the challenge of finding a
framework that is both sufficiently concrete (to be manageable for police
officers) and sufficiently technology-neutral (to be sustainable in light of
significant and ongoing socio-technical change). Thus, balancing the benefits of
both approaches, while attending to the drawbacks and mitigation strategies
noted above, may provide a better way forward, providing practical, usable
guidance for police officers on the ground while at the same time recognizing
that not all searches of digital devices are, or need to be, flights to the moon.

391. See supra Part II.D.2.
392. We make a similar argument in the context of police hacking powers. See Škorvánek et al., supra note
18, at 1080–81.
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